What is a Term Sheet?

A venture capital investor will normally only subscribe to a preferred class of shares. These are shares to which certain rights attach, that are not shared by ordinary shares held by the founders and others. Venture capital investors require these additional rights because in most cases they are investing much larger sums than the founders (whose investment usually takes the form of good ideas, time and a small amount of seed money) and at a much higher valuation. The venture capital investors will also have less control over the company’s day-to-day operations than the founders, who typically remain closely involved in management.

If a preferred share class already exists at the time of an investment round, the new round of investors will typically create a new series of preferred shares to distinguish the rights (voting, financial, etc.) that attach to their preferred series from those that attach to all prior series of shares. Distinguishing the rights enjoyed by different series is common practice because the investments made at the time of the creation of each series are usually based on different company valuations and circumstances and, consequently, have different risk profiles.

In some Continental European jurisdictions, there are restrictions on the types of different shares classes permissible. This can be compensated for to an extent by creating special rights for certain shareholders in the investment documentation.

2. Valuation and milestones

The venture capital investors will agree with the company on a valuation for the company prior to the new investment round (the pre-money valuation). The pre-money valuation is used to determine the price per share to be paid by investors on the completion of the new investment round (the purchase price). The purchase price is calculated by dividing the pre-money valuation by the fully diluted number of shares of the company immediately prior to the time of completion. In the example in Section III the pre-money valuation agreed is £200,000 and immediately prior to completion there are 100 ordinary shares. The value of those shares and therefore the purchase price of the incoming investor is £200,000/100 which equals £2,000 per share.

Fully diluted usually includes shares that have been issued by the company, shares allocated to the employee option pool (see paragraph 21 below) and any other shares which the company could be required to issue through options, warrants, convertible debt or other commitments. The pre-money valuation should be distinguished from the post-money valuation, which refers to the valuation of the company immediately following (and which includes the investment proceeds from) the new round. Therefore, following completion of the example in Section III, NewCo has an undiluted post-money valuation of £400,000 represented by £200,000 pre-money valuation and £200,000 of investment. If the option pool is included in the calculation the fully diluted post-money valuation is £440,000 i.e. £2,000 x (200 shares + 20 options).

Quite often, venture capital investors will not wish to make all of their investment on completion. Instead they will invest in tranches, subject to various technical and/or commercial targets (milestones) being met. These milestones will be set out in the Subscription Agreement. Failure to meet a milestone does not automatically mean that the investors will not provide the additional money, but it may mean that they will seek to negotiate different terms for these amounts.

Sometimes a mechanism, a ratchet is used to adjust the respective shareholdings of the investors and the founders depending on either the company's performance or the level of returns on an exit (exit ratchet). This technique is principally used to find a bridge between widely differing views of a company's value, or to provide additional incentives/rewards to the founders for delivering excellent returns to the investors. Ratchets can be complicated in operation and need to be very carefully thought through due to tax issues and in order to avoid conflicts of interest between the founders, the company and its other shareholders at a later date

3. Dividend rights

Venture capital investors often invest in early stage companies that are in an intense growth phase. The objective is to grow the business and its value and to realise a return on investment (ROI), typically targeting a multiple of the amounts invested – on exit. In most cases such companies should be reinvesting all profits (without which a dividend cannot be paid) to continue growing the company, rather than paying dividends to shareholders. Sometimes there is a prohibition on the payment of any dividend, which may be for a limited period of time.

Even if the payment of a dividend is permitted, a common way of ensuring that a company is not obliged to pay dividends while it is growing is to provide the investors with a share class that has a preferential, cumulative dividend, usually fixed at a percentage of the purchase price paid for each preferred share. The company will also be prevented from paying any dividend to other shareholders until the dividend is paid to the holders of the preferred shares. Since that dividend cumulates usually until an exit (see paragraph 18 below), it effectively prevents any other dividend being paid until then. In addition, investors will often have an overriding right to veto the payment of any dividend.

If a dividend is cumulative, it means that for each period that the dividend accrues (e.g. quarterly or annually) any amounts not paid are cumulated until the company has the necessary cash. At that time the cumulated accrued amounts must be paid to the investors’ share class in their entirety, before any dividends can be paid to other share classes. If the preferred shares are converted into ordinary shares, the investors will usually expect all accumulated dividends to be paid or capitalised into ordinary shares on such conversion.

In addition to a dividend preference, venture capital investors typically require that the preferred shares be entitled to participate in any distributions on the ordinary shares, or in other words, to enjoy a pro rata share of any dividends paid to the ordinary shares on top of any dividend preference paid only to the preferred shares. Allowing preferred participation ensures that a company cannot declare a small preferential dividend to the preferred holders followed by a much larger dividend to the ordinary shareholders.

In some jurisdictions, escalating dividend provisions can be used to encourage the company to work towards an exit and to help its investors recover some of their investment if the company fails. These require the company, if it has not achieved a successful exit (see paragraph 18 below) within a certain period of time, to declare and pay cumulative dividends to preferred shareholders at rates that increase each year.

4. Liquidation preference and deemed liquidation

The liquidation preference is a right which can be required by venture capital investors in recognition of the risk they bear on their capital contribution. While there are many variations, the liquidation preference typically provides that, in the event the company is liquidated or subject to a deemed liquidation (see below), the preferred shareholders will receive a certain amount of the proceeds before any other shareholders. This preference amount may be equal to the amount of the preferred shareholders’ investment, or a multiple of it.

The remaining proceeds are often then shared amongst the preferred and ordinary shareholders. There are numerous ways in which this may be effected, but the most common are:

• the remaining proceeds are shared pro rata, according to their percentage shareholding, among the preferred and ordinary shareholders (in which case the preferred shares are considered fully participating, i.e. after receiving the preference amount, the preferred shareholders participate fully with the ordinary shareholders in sharing the remaining proceeds);

• after payment of the liquidation preference amount, the ordinary shareholders may catch up by receiving an amount equal to the amount paid by them or credited as paid by them for their shares, thereafter the proceeds being shared out on a pro rata basis between all shareholders (in which case the preferred shares are considered simple participating).

The size and structure of the liquidation preference will be negotiated to reflect the risk inherent in each investment round: the higher the risk, the higher the required return. Many factors (including the valuation of the company) will be considered in this calculation.

Venture capital investors usually require that the liquidation preference applies not only in connection with a liquidation or winding up of the company, but also in the case of a deemed liquidation, a term usually defined to include a merger, acquisition, change of control or consolidation of the company, or a sale of all or most of its assets, but sometimes also includes an initial public offering (IPO) or a qualified exit (see paragraph 18 below).

The example below shows what would happen if there were liquidity events at the value of £200,000 or £1,000,000 in each of the following scenarios (all of which assume a fully participating liquidation preference based upon the issued share capital following the seed round described in Box 2 of Section III):

Where there is no liquidation preference attached to the 'A' shares


1 x liquidation preference


2 x liquidation preference.

In this example, in the event the company is only sold for £200,000 the investor will only get his money back if he has negotiated a liquidation preference so that the first £200,000 from such an event goes to the investor. In the event of a sale at £1,000,000 the calculation works so that in the event of 1x preference the first £200,000 goes to the investor and then the remaining £800,000 is shared pro rata in accordance with the shareholding, in this case 50:25:25.

5. Redemption

The right of redemption is the right to demand under certain conditions that the company buys back its own shares from its investors at a fixed price. This right may be included to require a company to buy back its shares if there has not been an exit within a pre-determined period. Failure to redeem shares when requested might result in the investors gaining improved rights, such as enhanced voting rights.

A right of redemption is not appropriate for every investment and is not allowed or is limited

(e.g. to a certain percentage of the issued and outstanding shares) in some jurisdictions in Continental Europe. In those parts of Europe where it is allowed, subject to certain restrictions, redemption can be used to ensure that the venture capital investors recover some of their investment if a company has not been able to achieve a successful exit (see paragraph 18 below) within a certain period of time. However, in the UK and certain other jurisdictions, there are legal requirements that must be satisfied before a company can redeem any of its shares.

A right of redemption can also be used by an investor where it needs to strongly discourage a company from breaching certain obligations, by providing a way for the investor to dispose quickly of its shareholding. In jurisdictions where redemption is not possible under local company law, an alternative is to negotiate a conditional right for the investors to put (sell) their shares to the founders at a fixed price.

6. Conversion rights

Where venture capital investors hold a preferred class of shares and it is permitted to convert these to ordinary shares, they generally require the right to convert them at any time, at an initial conversion ratio of 1:1. Conversion is normally delayed until exit so that investors are able to avoid losing the rights attached to the preferred class of shares.

This conversion ratio will be adjusted to take account of any reorganisation of a company's capital structure. In some jurisdictions, this conversion ratio can be adjusted to provide for a form of anti-dilution protection (see paragraph 8 below). If a dilutive event has occurred and this ratio has been increased, the investor may choose or may be compelled to convert its preferred shares into ordinary shares immediately prior to a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or an IPO).

7. Automatic conversion of share class/series

In most cases, investors will be required to convert all of their shares into ordinary shares prior to a company listing its shares on a publicly traded exchange. Venture capital investors often require an automatic conversion mechanism for all share classes, effective immediately prior to an IPO. Investors will only want this conversion mechanism to work where an IPO is likely to provide a sufficient opportunity for them to dispose of their shares (liquidity) after the expiry of any lock up periods. Accordingly the investors usually define certain criteria in advance that must be met for an IPO to trigger automatic conversion (usually referred to as a Qualified IPO), e.g. only offerings on certain exchanges, by recognised national underwriters, at a valuation exceeding a certain threshold and raising at least a minimum amount of gross proceeds. Otherwise, preferred shareholders would risk having their shares converted and losing all of their preferential rights even if the company lists its shares at a low value on a minor exchange.

8. Anti-dilution (or price protection)

Venture capital investors often require anti-dilution protection rights to protect the value of their stake in the company, if new shares are issued at a valuation which is lower than that at which they originally invested (a down round). This protection usually functions by applying a mathematical formula to calculate a number of new shares which the investors will receive, for no or minimal cost, to offset the dilutive effect of the issue of cheaper shares.

There are several variations of the formula, each providing different degrees of protection. These include full ratchet protection, which will maintain investors' full percentage ownership at the same level or at the same value in down rounds. Other versions of the formula provide some compensation for the dilution, but allow the ownership percentage to fall; the most common of these is weighted average. The level of protection required by an investor depends on several factors, including the valuation of the company at the time of the investment and the perceived exposure to further financing requirements.

While the basic concept remains the same, there are several different mechanisms used in Continental European jurisdictions to create this protection. In the UK, the mechanism of adjusting the conversion ratio of preferred shares to ordinary shares to adjust for dilutions can be used, although other methods, including the issue of shares for a nominal sum or bonus shares, are also used. The latter might involve the granting of options (or warrants as they are sometimes referred to), which are only exercisable if the anti-dilution provision is triggered.

In the example set out in Box 2 of Section III, if the project did not proceed as well as expected and when the time came to raise another round from new investors it emerged that these potential new investors were only prepared to invest at a pre-money valuation (for them) of £200,000, this would imply that they would only pay £1,000 per share (£200,000/200). However the existing investors paid £2,000 per share and therefore, under full anti-dilution provisions, their shareholding would be adjusted in order to issue them with new shares, the effect of which would be to bring the price they paid for the 'A' shares to £1,000 per share.

The result of the full anti-dilution provisions is that the existing investors would have to be issued with a further 100 shares to bring their shareholding to 200 for which they paid a total of £200,000 which equals £1,000 per share. In terms of the overall shareholding this brings the ownership of the business between the founders, academic institution and investors to 50 shares: 50 shares: 200 shares or 16.6%:16.6%:66.6% (a change from 50 shares: 50 shares: 100 shares or 25%:25%:50%).

9. Founder shares

Founders and senior management are usually central to the decision of venture capital investors to put money into a company. Having decided to put money behind a management team they have confidence in, investors are usually keen to ensure that they remain in place to deliver their business plan. Therefore, it is often the case that founders and key managers (and sometimes all shareholders/employees who leave the company within a certain period of time are required to offer to sell their shares back to the company or to other shareholders. The price paid for the shares may depend upon circumstances of departure – it may be at market value if the founder/manager is deemed to be a good leaver, or it might be considerably less in the case of a bad leaver. A bad leaver may be someone who has breached his contract of employment, or it may also be someone who resigns from the company within a particular period. The Board often retains the right to determine whether to implement the bad leaver provisions.

In addition or as an alternative to good leaver/bad leaver provisions, investors may require that shares held by founders who are employees or consultants be subject to a vesting schedule in order to incentivise the founders not to leave employment with the company in the short term. The effect of this is that anyone holding such shares must be employed or engaged as a consultant by the company for a certain period of time if that person is to obtain unrestricted ownership of all of their shares. Within that period shares may vest on a straight-line basis or on whatever basis is negotiated. Sometimes founders have different vesting schedules in recognition of their different levels of contribution to the company.

In NewCo it was decided that the founder's 50 shares would vest on a straight-line basis over 4 years, with the first year's allocation vesting on the completion of the venture capital investment.

If a founder leaves within the requisite period, he will keep only that proportion of his shares that are deemed to be vested. In this example, if the founder left between 12-24 months, 25 shares or 50% of the shareholding would have vested. The remaining shares that are unvested lose their value, either by being bought back by the company for a nominal amount or converted into deferred shares which have no rights attaching to them. It may be decided that on certain events such as death or incapacity or where a founder's employment may terminate through no fault of their own, the vesting schedule is accelerated either partially or fully. The Board may retain the right to determine such issues at the time, in the light of circumstances.

10. Pre-emption rights on new share issues

If the company makes any future share offering, a venture capital investor will require the right to maintain at least its percentage stake in the company by participating in the new offering up to the amount of its pro rata holding, under the same terms and conditions as other participating investors. This pre-emption right is automatically provided for by law in the UK and most Continental European jurisdictions, although it can be waived.

If the new offering is based on a company valuation lower than that used for an investor's prior investment, that investor may also receive shares under its anti-dilution rights (see paragraph 8 above). Certain issues will usually be exempted from the pre-emption rights, including the issue of anti-dilution shares and the issue of shares on the exercise of share options.

11. Right of first refusal, co-sale and tag along rights

These are contractual terms between shareholders which are usually included in the Articles of Association. If one shareholder wishes to dispose of shares that are subject to a right of first refusal (ROFR), it must first offer them to those other shareholders who have the benefit of the ROFR. There are usually certain exceptions to the ROFR, such as the right of individuals to transfer shares to close relatives and trusts and investors to transfer shares freely to third parties, each other or within an investor's group. The requirement to go through a ROFR process may add several weeks to the timescale for selling shares.

If a shareholder wishes to dispose of shares that are the subject of a co-sale or tag along right, the other shareholders who benefit from the right can insist that the potential purchaser agrees to purchase an equivalent percentage of their shares, at the same price and under the same terms and conditions. This may have the effect of making the shares more difficult to sell.

A venture capital investor's decision to invest in a company is often based largely on the strength of the technical and management experience of the founders and management. It does not want these individuals to dispose of their shares in the company while it remains an investor. Consequently, investors frequently require a ROFR as well as co-sale/tag along rights on any sale of shares by a founder or key managers. Indeed they may sometimes require a prohibition on founders and key managers selling shares for a stated period.

Sometimes in the UK the investor class will create a ROFR on each other's shares. Some investors are strongly against this because it can make their shares more difficult to sell (less liquid) and potentially less valuable since a prospective buyer will often be reluctant to make an offer for shares that can be pre-empted by someone else.

12. Drag along or bring along

A drag along provision (sometimes called bring along) creates an obligation on all shareholders of the company to sell their shares to a potential purchaser if a certain percentage of the shareholders (or of a specific class of shareholders) vote to sell to that purchaser. Often in early rounds drag along rights can only be enforced with the consent of those holding at least a majority of the shares held by investors. These rights can be useful in the context of a sale where potential purchasers will want to acquire 100% of the shares of the company in order to avoid having responsibilities to minority shareholders after the acquisition. Many jurisdictions provide for such a process, usually when a third party has acquired at least 90% of the shares (sometimes referred to as a squeeze out), but the legal process is usually subject to possible court review.

Venture capital investors may require that certain exceptions are included in drag along provisions for situations when they cannot be obligated to sell their shares. Among these are drag along sales where the investors will not receive cash or marketable securities in return for their shares or will be required to provide to the purchaser representations and warranties concerning the company (or indemnify those given by the company or the founders) or covenants (such as non-compete and non-solicitation of employees).

13. Representations and warranties

Venture capital investors expect appropriate representations and warranties to be provided by key founders and management and, in jurisdictions where it is allowed, the company. The primary purpose of the representations and warranties is to provide the investors with a complete and accurate understanding of the current condition of the company and its past history so that the investors can evaluate the risks of investing in the company prior to subscribing for its shares. The representations and warranties will typically cover areas such as the legal existence of the company (including all share capital details), the company's financial statements, the business plan, assets (in particular intellectual property rights), liabilities, material contracts, employees and litigation.

It is very rare that a company is in a perfect state! The warrantors have the opportunity to set out issues which ought to be brought to the attention of the new investors via the disclosure letter or schedule of exceptions. This is usually provided by the warrantors and discloses detailed information concerning any exceptions to or carve-outs from the representations and warranties (e.g. specific company assets, contracts, shareholders, employees, etc.). If a matter is referred to in the disclosure letter the investors are deemed to have notice of it and will not be able to claim for breach of warranty in respect of that matter.

Investors expect those providing representations and warranties about the company to back them up with a contractual obligation to reimburse them in the event that the representations and warranties are inaccurate or if there are exceptions to them that have not been fully disclosed. There are usually limits to the exposure of the warrantors, which are a matter for negotiation when documentation is being drawn up, and vary according to the severity of the breach, the size of the investment and the financial resources of the warrantors.

14. Voting rights

Venture capital investors will have certain consent and voting rights that attach to their class of shares (see paragraph 15 below). Preferred shares may have equivalent voting rights to ordinary shares in a general meeting, though it is also possible that they may carry more than one vote per share under certain circumstances in jurisdictions where it is allowed.

Where an appropriate event has occurred that triggers a change in the conversion ratio, the number of votes that the investors' shares will carry for any subsequent general shareholder vote will often be automatically adjusted to reflect the change in the conversion ratio at the time of the vote.

15. Protective provisions and consent rights (class rights)

The venture capital investors in an investment round normally require that certain actions cannot be taken by the company without the consent of the holders of a majority (or other specific percentage) of their class or series of shares (investor majority). Sometimes these consent rights are split between consent of an investor majority, consent of the investor director(s) or consent of the Board. Typically what requires investor majority consent and what requires investor director consent would relate to major changes in the company such as those set out in the paragraph below whereas operational matters that need more urgent consideration by the Board would be left for board consent. Alternatively, each of the largest investors may have specific consent rights. The purpose of these rights is to protect the investors from the company taking actions which may adversely affect the value of their investment.

The types of actions covered include (among many others): changes to share classes and share rights, changes to the company's capital structure, issuance of new shares, mergers and acquisitions, the sale of major assets, winding up or liquidating the company, declaring dividends, incurring debts above a certain amount, appointing key members of the management team and materially changing the company's business plan. These shareholder rights are particularly important for investors who do not appoint a director to the Board of Directors (see paragraph 16 below).

Note that in some Continental European jurisdictions, local company law requires that some of the actions covered by these consent rights remain the unfettered right of the Board of Directors to decide. In such cases, the Articles of Association of the company will usually require that the level of majority needed for a board decision concerning these actions include the agreement of an appropriate number of the directors appointed by the investors.

Alongside these consent rights, there are usually various undertakings or covenants given by the company or sometimes the founders to do certain acts. Typically these include taking steps to protect intellectual property, applying investment monies in accordance with the business plan and maintaining appropriate insurance. Other types of covenants are described in the sections below headed Information Rights (see paragraph 17 below) and Confidentiality, Intellectual Property Assignment and Management Non-compete Agreements (see paragraph 20 below).

16. Board of Directors/Board Observer

﷓Venture capital investors require that the company has an appropriate Board of Directors (note: in some Continental European jurisdictions, e.g. Germany, a two-tiered board is required: a Management Board and a Supervisory Board and in other Continental European jurisdictions where two-tiered board systems are optional, e.g. France, some investors prefer one board). In accordance with what is regarded as UK corporate governance best practice, investors usually prefer the Board to have a majority of non-executive directors (i.e. directors who are not employees of the company). Although a majority of non-executives may be impractical for small companies, it is usual for such companies to have at least one or two non-executives. One or more of the non-executive directors will be appointed by the investors under rights granted to them in the investment documentation. Some investors will never appoint a director, because of potential conflicts of interest and liability issues and will instead require the right to appoint a Board Observer, who can attend all board meetings, but who will not participate in any board decisions. The Board of Directors tends to meet once a month in general, in particular for early stage companies with active investors on the Board.

In many cases, investors will require that the Board has a Remuneration or Compensation Committee to decide on compensation for company executives, including share option grants (see paragraph 21 below), as well as an Audit Committee to oversee financial reporting. These committees will be made up entirely or of a majority of non-executive directors and will include the directors appointed by the investors. Each of these committees should have its own mandate set out in writing.

By law, like all directors, the investor directors' responsibilities are to act in the interest of the company rather than as a representative of the funds that they manage. Often venture capitalists separate the investment decisions for the funds invested in the companies from the investor director's decisions in order to avoid conflicts of interests for the investor director. This is typically done by having another investment executive representing the funds' interests when dealing with the company with respect to the Investor consent matters.

17. Information rights

In order for venture capital investors to monitor the condition of their investment, it is essential that the company provides them with certain regular updates concerning its financial condition and budgets, as well as a general right to visit the company and examine its books and records. This sometimes includes direct access to the company's auditors and bankers. These contractually defined obligations typically include timely transmittal of audited annual financial statements, annual budgets, and unaudited monthly and quarterly financial statements. However it should be noted that in some Continental European jurisdictions, a company is required to treat all shareholders equally, so that any information provided to one shareholder will have to be provided to all shareholders.

18. Exit

Venture capital investors want to see a path from their investment in the company leading to an exit, most often in the form of a disposal of its shares following an IPO or by participating in a sale. Sometimes the threshold for a liquidity event (see paragraph 4 above) or conversion (see paragraph 6 above) will be a qualified exit. If used, it will mean that a liquidity event will only occur and conversion of preferred shares will only be compulsory if an IPO falls within the definition of a qualified exit. A qualified exit is usually defined as a sale or IPO on a recognised investment exchange which in either case is of a certain value to ensure the investors get a minimum return on their investment.

Consequently, investors usually require undertakings from the company and other shareholders that they will endeavour to achieve an appropriate share listing or trade sale within a limited period of time (typically five to seven years depending on the stage of investment and the maturity of the company). If such an exit is not achieved, investors often build in structures which will allow them to withdraw some or all of the amount of their investment (see paragraphs 3 and 5 above).

19. Registration rights

Registration rights are a US securities law concept that is alien to many European companies and investors. Such rights are needed because securities can only be offered for public sale in the US (with certain exceptions) if they have first been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The registration process involves the company whose shares are to be offered providing significant amounts of information about its operations and financial condition, which can be time consuming and costly.

Unlike in European jurisdictions, where all of a company's shares usually become tradable upon a public listing, a company registering shares to be traded in the US is not required to register all of its outstanding shares. Any shares that are left unregistered can only be traded under very restricted circumstances, which can greatly diminish their value. Consequently, investors in the US or in companies which may consider pursuing a listing in the US, usually require the company to enter into a Registration Rights Agreement. Among other things, this gives the investors rights to demand registration of their shares (demand rights) and to have their shares registered along with any other shares of the company being registered (piggy-back rights) and allocates costs and potential liabilities associated with the registration process.

20. Confidentiality, Intellectual Property Assignment and Management Non-compete Agreements

It is good practice for any company to have certain types of agreements in place with its employees. For technology start-ups, this generally includes Confidentiality Agreements (to protect against loss of company trade secrets, know-how, customer lists, and other potentially sensitive information), Intellectual Property Assignment Agreements (to ensure that intellectual property developed by academic institutions or by employees before they were employed by the company will belong to the company) and Employment Contracts or Consultancy Agreements (which will include provisions to ensure that all intellectual property developed by a company's employees belongs to the company). Where the company is a spin-out from an academic institution, the founders will frequently be consultants of the company and continue to be employees of the academic institution, at least until the company is more established.

Investors also seek to have key founders and managers enter into Non-compete Agreements with the company. In most cases, the investment in the company is based largely on the value of the technology and management experience of the management team and founders. If they were to leave the company to create or work for a competitor, this could significantly affect the company's value. Investors normally require that these agreements be included in the Investment Agreement as well as in the Employment/Consultancy Agreements with the founders and senior managers, to enable them to have a right of direct action against the founders and managers if the restrictions are breached.

21. Employee share option plan

An employee share option plan (ESOP) is a plan that reserves and allocates a percentage of the shares of the company for share option grants to current and future employees of the company (and certain other individuals) at the discretion of a management committee. The intention is to provide an incentive for the employees by allowing them to share in the financial rewards resulting from the success of the company. Investors typically want 10%-20% of the share capital of the company to be reserved in an ESOP creating an option pool. The company will then be able to issue the shares under the plan without requiring further approval from the investors. Founders and other management with significant shareholdings may be excluded from participating in the ESOP.

22. Transaction and monitoring fees

Venture capital investors are usually paid a fee by the company to cover internal and external costs incurred in connection with the investment process. In some jurisdictions this might constitute illegal financial assistance. Some investors may require an annual monitoring fee to compensate for the level of their involvement with the investee company, in addition to the usual compensation for travel and out-of-pocket expenses with relation to the investment management.

23. Confidentiality

All exchanges of confidential information between potential venture capital investors and the company need to be subject to a Confidentiality Agreement. This agreement should be executed as soon as discussions with the company about a potential investment begin. If this has not been done then a confidentiality restriction should be included in the Term Sheet.

24. Exclusivity

Once a Term Sheet is signed, venture capital investors will undertake various types of due diligence on the company (any or all of technical, commercial, legal and financial). They will usually provide the company with a list of areas which they would like to cover and information which they would like to receive. The process can take several weeks or even months and the investors may also use third party advisors to assist them in the process (e.g. lawyers, accountants and consultants). This will involve expense and the investors will not want to discover that while they are incurring this expense the company accepts investment from other investors. To protect themselves, some investors will ask for an exclusivity period during which the company is prohibited from seeking investment from any third parties. A breach of this obligation will result in the company and founders incurring a financial penalty.

25. Enforceability

With the exception of clauses dealing with confidentiality, transaction fees and exclusivity, the provisions of a signed Term Sheet will not be intended to be legally binding. It should, however, be noted that in some Continental European jurisdictions there is an obligation to act in good faith when deciding not to proceed with an investment either at all or on the terms set out in the Term Sheet. If so, it might not be possible for the investors or the company to walk away from or unilaterally seek to change the Term Sheet without a justifiable reason.

26. Conditions precedent

A full list of conditions to be satisfied before investment will be included in the Term Sheet. A venture capital investment will usually be conditional on not only the negotiation of definitive legal documents, but the satisfactory completion of due diligence and approval by the Investment Committee of each of the venture capital investors.

Satisfactory completion of due diligence can include conclusion of commercial, scientific and intellectual property due diligence, a review of current trading and forecasts, a review of existing and proposed management service contracts, a review of the company's financial history and current financial position, either a full legal review or one targeted on specific areas and, if it is not already in place, obtaining key man insurance and satisfactory references and checks on key employees.

It is also common for investors to require the founders and senior management to sign up to Employment or Consultancy Agreements in a form approved by the investors. In the case of investment from VCTs it will also be a condition that before they invest the appropriate tax clearance has been obtained from the Inland Revenue.

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