Aftershocks. The referendum has exposed and enhanced fundamental fault-lines in UK politics

With little more than a week left of the referendum campaign and the opinion polls have shifted in a seemingly dramatic but not necessarily decisive fashion. Throughout this contest there has been a sharp difference between surveys conducted online and by telephone. Until very recently, online polls have suggested that the result would be very close while telephone surveys have indicated a consistent if not crushing Remain advantage of 7-12 percentage points. As the telephone polls were more accurate in the 2015 general election campaign and there are strong reasons to suspect that online surveys are being influenced by the “passion gap” between Leave and Remain in this ballot, most observers have concluded on the basis of this evidence that a Remain victory was probable.
In recent days, however, there has been a switch. The clear pattern of online polls has been to hint at a Leave victory of, on average, 5-10 points, while it is now telephone polls which imply a virtual tie. This shift appears to be down to working class Labour-inclined electors moving to Leave largely over the migration question. This may not prove decisive. As in the Scottish referendum campaign of September 2014 those advocating change may have peaked too early so triggering second thoughts and doubts about the boldness of the course suggested. The impact on the markets and sterling that a possible Brexit has triggered may serve to return the economy to centre stage. Finally, the implied relative turnout of social class DE voters in all polls (online and telephone) looks suspiciously high.
What is in no doubt is that the referendum campaign has been an earthquake in British politics and like all tremors of this magnitude it will have aftershocks. They will be more vigorous than the Prime Minister anticipated when he first conceded the principle of a national vote in January 2013 or when he named the date a little more than three years later. He had hoped that the split over the question at the very top of his party would be slight and that those contesting EU membership would seek to avoid “blue on blue” attacks or a wider dissection of government policy as much as possible. He also assumed that the Labour Party would aspire to and be capable of delivering its traditional support to the Remain lobby more or less unanimously. None of this seems to have occurred in practice. What he (and we) can instead expect is a distinct and very difficult post-referendum political landscape.
The divisions exposed within the Conservative Party are about more than personality and policy
The referendum has been a traumatic event for the Conservative Party. It is tempting to see this as predominantly the consequence of personality, supplemented a touch by real policy disagreement. If it were only about personal ambition, though, it would be much more manageable afterwards. It is not, and therefore it will prove to be more challenging to reconcile the various factions in the party.
What the referendum has exposed is the extent to which UK Conservatives are divided in a manner similar to if more muted than the US Republicans. Very crudely put, there are two separate streams in the Conservative electorate. The first can be crassly described as “Economy First”. This section is primarily concerned by market economics, free trade and low taxation. That is its motivation. It is less interested in, and somewhat centrist, even liberal, on matters such as gender roles, sexuality, multi-culturalism and multi-racialism, or the merits or not of established cultural traditions. It is also comfortable with the UK conducting its foreign affairs through international institutions such as the EU, NATO and the UN, even if these entities can be cumbersome, rather than Britain striking out on a unilateralist or isolationist stance. It sees itself as being entirely at ease with the “modern world”.
The second segment can be sweepingly labelled “Social First”. This segment is most concerned about moral values, cultural tradition and national identity. It is will sign up to the economic agenda but that support is conditional. It favours tax cuts for those in the middle, not the rich. It much prefers small business to large corporations. It opposes “unfair” overseas competition. Its foreign policy instincts are highly patriotic and it does not care for the notion that the UK should compromise on its own interests for the sake of international cohesion. It is not at all at ease with the “modern world”.
The UK Conservatives, like the pre-Trump US Republicans, have held these two manifestly different constituencies together for five, essentially similar, reasons. First, since 1945 the “Economy First” camp has dominated its elites and so largely controlled the party organisation. Second, those elites have been willing to make enough sometimes small and symbolic concessions to the “Social First” fraternity to keep them inside the tent. Third, the foreign policy divide has been blurred by wrapping essentially international interventions in nationalist rhetoric. Fourth, the primary opponents of the Conservatives/Republicans, namely Labour/Democrats, have been a sufficiently clear and credible threat to both the Economy First and Social First tendencies to fuse them together. Whenever this has not been the case, such as during the Blair/Clinton era, the centre-right model is in deep trouble. Finally, no controversy has come along in the post-1945 age that has threatened an absolute divide between the two sections in the way that free trade versus protection did for a century before then.
Europe, or more precisely the combination of EU membership and the free migration of labour, has completely split the “Economy First” and “Social First” elements of UK conservatism and it is hard to see how that rupture can be reconciled irrespective of which individual succeeds David Cameron. It is also tough to imagine a policy agenda that binds these factions together. Civil War is more likely.
The referendum has further divided the Corbyn leadership from his mainstream MP colleagues
While the referendum campaign has been more about the Conservative Party’s internal angst than the Labour Party’s agonies it has served to reinforce those divisions as well. The clear majority of Labour MPs have been aghast at the comparative indifference of Jeremy Corbyn and his closest supporters to whether or not the UK should continue to be part of the European Union. The official Labour “In” campaign has been willing to co-operate with Conservatives and others to advance their cause. The Labour leader, on the other hand, has offered a completely independent message. He and his inner court have been shamelessly focused on tightening their control over the Labour Party machine in the expectation of amending the rules to consolidate their authority before moving on to impose sweeping changes in policy, particularly national security. The post-referendum publication of the Chilcot Report into the Iraq War will be an enormously significant moment within Labour Party circles as the party finds itself dividing again between Anti-Blair and Pro-Blair combatants.
Except the response of the defeated faction will be different. The Labour moderates are in an even more desperate situation than it might seem. They are hopelessly divided on tactics, never mind on strategy. Some want to force a leadership challenge even though they know it would be futile. There are others who hope that a coup could be attempted not today, but in 2017. There are others who have concluded that change before 2020 is impossible and that the moderates should simply sit this Parliament out before reassuming control on a “We told you so” ticket after the next election. There are others who want to make Sadiq Khan’s regime in London as sort of Labour government-in-exile. There are others who want a different way out by running for Mayor of Manchester or Liverpool (or Bognor?). Others will leave politics. For Labour it is less a Civil War than a guerrilla war that beckons.