Biting the Ballot: The EU’s year of elections offers complexity and opportunity for May
The second ballot of the primary for the nomination of the French mainstream centre-right party produced an outcome that in any ordinary year would have counted as its greatest electoral surprise and an immense embarrassment for the opinion polling industry. A mere two weeks ago François Fillon, the former Prime Minister of France, was, as he had been for months, marooned in a distant third place behind Alain Juppé, another ex-PM, and Nicolas Sarkozy, the former President, and so appeared to be destined for an early departure from the contest. Yet as matters transpired he then stormed his way to lead the first ballot with 44% of all votes cast and then three days completed the rout of his rivals with 67% in the final competition. He is now red-hot favourite to become President.
The Fillon upset is, however, but the opening salvo in what will be an extraordinary 12-month period of elections and other forms of democratic instruments across the European Union that will have profound consequences not only for the individual nations concerned, but the EU as a whole and, crucially from a British perspective, the political context in which the Brexit negotiations occur.
December 2016: Austria and Italy
This rollercoaster starts on Sunday with two ballots which strictly speaking do not involve the composition of a government. Austrians will vote as to whom should serve as their President, an office of limited constitutional authority but considerable symbolic value. This is a re-run of a vote earlier this year which was so close and involved enough examples of irregularity that the courts threw out the original verdict.
The central question is whether Norbert Hofer of the far-right Freedom Party manages to defeat an independent Green backed by most of the establishment (after the two long-standing orthodox forces of the centre-left and centre-right could not nominate contenders with sufficient popular appeal) and thus become the first far-right Head of State of any European nation since 1945. The polls (for what they are worth) imply an extremely tight result.
A loss for mainstream politicians here, if stunning, would not have the potential impact of the constitutional referendum in Italy to be held on the same day. Here, the sitting Prime Minister, Matteo Renzi, of the soft-left Democratic Party, has pledged to stand down if the country does not accept his blueprint for diluting the strength of the Senate and local government and hence, in his view, allow Italy to escape from the political paralysis that has often been its post-war hallmark. The Renzi package appears to be in trouble which could open the way either to a technocratic Cabinet without the mandate to deal with a looming crisis in the banking sector or, alternatively, to a fresh election which the Five Star Movement, led by Beppo Grillo, a famous comedian turned anti-politics politician, and the separatist Northern League could do extremely well in. Such an outcome would not simply shake Rome to its core but could easily trigger fresh doubt about the future of the euro.
March 2017: The Netherlands
In normal circumstances the exact composition of the Dutch Government would be of little interest beyond its own borders. In our era, by contrast, it is likely to be seen as a further indicator as to how much traditional institutions are imperilled by populist insurgents. The current liberal-conservative VVD’s standing as the largest party in the Dutch Parliament is under threat from the PVV (the Party for Freedom) led by Geert Wilders, while the PvdA, the equivalent of the Labour Party, which is the second element of the present administration, looks set for a very heavy defeat as its historic working class base is inclined to defect to a populist alternative (sound familiar?). If the PVV comes top then it could only be excluded from power by a weak, incoherent, mixture of other parties.
April/May/June 2017: France
Politics in Paris is likely to be in a state of deep flux as the first and second rounds of the presidential election are held, followed after a short break by two rounds of elections for the National Assembly. The ruling Socialist Party is in a state close to total meltdown as to what to do to save itself, a state so dire that earlier this week the Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, publicly mused as to whether he was obliged to stand against the President who had appointed him in the Socialist Primary. His heresy was understandable as his boss has approval ratings so catastrophically low that assuming that he throws his hat in the ring again he could come fifth on the opening ballot behind M. Fillon, Marine Le Pen, a veteran hard left activist and a renegade centrist.
The working assumption is, therefore, that the mainstream centre-left is doomed in the presidential battle, with the ultimate choice for France falling between M. Fillon and Ms Le Pen but with considerable uncertainty as to what will take place in the National Assembly contest once the Socialists have put the curse of M. Hollande behind them. Logic suggests that the mainstream ‘Gaullist’ centre-right will secure the presidency and sweep to a commanding victory in Parliament but logic has had a lousy 2016 and may do no better in 2017.
September or October 2017: Germany
Last but certainly not least will come the largest and most important actor in European politics. In one sense, this is the most predictable election of them all as Angela Merkel has declared that she will seek a fourth term as Chancellor and despite the controversy triggered by her ‘open door’ on refugees she and her Christian Democrats/Christian Social Union are overwhelming favourites to be the largest party once all the ballots have been cast and so form the next administration in Berlin.
Yet exactly what that government will be depends on how badly the Social Democrats, her junior coalition partner since 2013, do, and how well the upstart Alternative für Deutschland performs. The AfD fell just short of the 5% threshold for representation in the national parliament four years ago but seems to be poised to achieve that result this time. Depending on the arithmetic and the post-election political calculations, an arguably disturbingly wide range of scenarios then beckon. These range from a minority Christian Democrat Cabinet (with the SPD deciding to lick its wounds in opposition), a continuation of the CDU/SPD arrangement but with smaller numbers and a severely challenging atmosphere around it, a CDU/SDP/Green formal or informal understanding, or, more theoretically, either a de facto CDU/AfD accord or even a tacit SPD/Green/Left Party arrangement.
What would suit Mrs May best from all these elections?
Put crudely, the optimal outcome would be one in which the establishment politicians and parties held on but with the anti-establishment opponents breathing down their necks and compelling them to contemplate more concessions on economic inclusion. The UK needs Mrs Merkel to be strong at home and capable of forging alliances within the EU-27 to move the European Commission and the European Parliament to the sidelines in the debate over Brexit. The shock emergence of M. Fillon as the probable next President of France is also a comparative blessing, not so much because he is a supposed ‘Thatcherite’ or married to a Welsh woman, but because he is far less empathic towards the institutions of Brussels and more sympathetic to anti-immigration feelings in France. Not all in the Conservative Party in the House of Commons, though, would agree with this analysis. Some Tory MPs contend that a total crisis in the EU would make the Brexit process more straightforward. The argument over harder or softer Brexit is thus set to be determined largely by the votes of others.
Tim Hames, Director General, BVCA
