Boris the Bold. A choice of prorogation dates that is politically astute but risky

It is, according to ministers, standard procedure, especially after the longest parliamentary session since 1653. Alternatively, according to their critics, it is a constitutional monstrosity, a virtual coup, shutting down Parliament at what is likely to prove a vital time in the Brexit drama.
The decision was certainly something of a surprise, known in advance by a handful of senior figures. In retrospect, there was a clue yesterday in the sudden cancellation of what had been billed as a major speech by the Chancellor on his economic strategy. Such an address would not have received much publicity if had taken place today. The action instead would not be in Birmingham (where Sajid Javid’s oration had been scheduled) but in Balmoral and a Privy Council Meeting with Her Majesty, The Queen.
What exactly has the Prime Minister done?
Before this morning, the assumption was that the House of Commons would return to business after the summer recess early next week, sit for about eight working days until around 12 September and then re-enter recess for the party conference season. It was then expected back again on or about 8 October when it would be in session continuously until a small break in mid-November. It would thus be sitting when the date for the UK’s departure from the EU is set for 31 October.
If matters proceed as the Government would wish, the timetable will be different. On or about 10 September the House of Commons will shut up shop but will formally prorogue rather than simply enter a recess. This means that a session of Parliament will have ended and a new one will have to start. This would be achieved by the mechanism of a Queen’s Speech which is now due to occur on Monday 14 October. The House will then sit continuously after that until mid-November.
So, on the face of it, such a shift is not exactly a seismic one. At most five probable sitting days (11-12 September and 8-10 October) will be lost. There is no suggestion that Parliament will be shut in the days leading up to 31 October and thus incapable of proffering its views on a no-deal Brexit. To that extent, some of the reaction to this initiative from Boris Johnson might seem to be excessive.
Why has he done it then?
There are a number of reasons why this is a politically slick and hence very controversial decision.
In terms of parliamentary procedure and Brexit, its impact is more profound than merely offering MPs a further five days in their constituencies. There were three points in the calendar when anti no-deal MPs could have attempted to find a device that would allow them to seize control of the parliamentary agenda and legislate to compel the Prime Minister to obtain an additional extension of Article 50.
The first was in the nine days or so in September when the House is back, but the weakness of that approach is that even dissident Conservative MPs would have been reluctant to have tied the Prime Minister’s hands before he had even had the chance to negotiate an alternative Withdrawal Agreement with the EU-27. The second was in the period from 8 October to the crucial EU Council on 17/18 October. The third was in what would be a truly frantic session from the Monday after that Council (21 October) until the deadline, EU-exit day of 31 October.
What this manoeuvre from the government does is shave time off any attempt to steal parliamentary time and then legislate across both the House of Commons and the House of Lords in September and, in effect, to knock out the middle period possibility in its entirety. That is because not only will the 8-10 October dates be taken off the table, the conventions around a Queen’s Speech is that it takes places on a set date, is then followed by between four to six days of debate on various strands of it and then a vote on it follows thereafter (21 or 22 October on present thinking). It would be virtually impossible to find a parliamentary device which would allow anti no-deal MPs to handcuff the PM before the EU Council on 17/18 October. The showdown would be wedged into the 10 days from October 21.
The second advantage of this strategy is that it allows the Prime Minister to set out what would be an advanced draft of a Conservative Party manifesto via the pomp and splendour of the Queen’s Speech, much of which will be trailed in advance at the Conservative Party conference less than a fortnight earlier. It is clear that this will be a shamelessly populist exercise with tax cuts, spending increases in areas where the public most favours more expenditure and a big emphasis on crime. This is not merely free but practically publicly subsidised publicity for a party political programme.
Finally, if this approach pays off, all roads lead to the opportunity of an early election. Either the Government will be defeated on its Queen’s Speech in which case there will be an election, or a last minute deal with the EU is secured which would be a personal triumph for Boris Johnson and allow him the chance to hit the hustings before Christmas, or, at a late hour, Parliament will block him on Brexit and he will have the excuse that he needs to demand a ‘the people versus parliament’ ballot.
There are, nonetheless, some risks in this strategy
This is far from a risk-free enterprise. There are three reasons why ministers might be apprehensive.
The first is that there is still an admittedly small window of opportunity for anti no-deal MPs to act when the House returns next week. If they do so by legislating for an extension of Article 50 (which looks extremely challenging politically and procedurally), the Government could respond by calling for a snap election for mid-October, which it would start as the clear favourite to win. Matters are more troublesome if there are enough kamikaze Conservatives who would be willing to travel far further and actually vote against their own administration in a vote of confidence, and then be ready to back an interim Prime Minister (Jeremy Corbyn or a more neutral figure) to acquire an Article 50 extension and then set a date for an election. In such a scenario, Mr Johnson would have his chance to make his pitch at the hustings but would forfeit the many, many advantages of incumbency.
The second is that the public mood shifts either because fears of a no-deal Brexit are successfully stoked or because some utterly unrelated, and perhaps even random, event intervenes which acts to the disadvantage of the Conservative Party and the Prime Minister. In which case, by late October Mr Johnson could find himself in a political state where all roads were indeed leading towards an early election (as he had once wanted) but he himself might not be the beneficiary of such a poll.
Finally, there is the danger that his scheme might work too well. He might find himself at the point where all the momentum is towards a no-deal Brexit and his opponents are too divided amongst themselves to stop it despite theoretically having the numbers in Parliament to stop him. This would be a huge leap into the unknown as nobody can really envision how hard a Hard Brexit, fallen into at short notice, would be and whether the end result would turn out to be an Apocalypse Now or a repeat of the Y2K ‘Millennium Bug’ saga witnessed almost two decades ago. In any case, it is difficult to see how the Government could call an early election while also responding to no-deal.
This could be that there is a further irony to come in this parliamentary thriller. It is that the MPs who were most enthusiastic about the prorogation of Parliament plan today (the pro-Brexit section of the Conservative Party) will ultimately find that the ticking of the clock and fear of an extension of Article 50 means that they will find themselves with little choice come late October but to vote for a version of the Withdrawal Agreement which is a long way short of the full re-write that they wanted.
Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA