21 Aug 2019

Boris Watch. What we have learnt about the new PM and Government after four weeks in office

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New Prime Ministers and new Governments need to establish themselves swiftly. That is as true in matters of presentation as it is in policy substance. The team around Boris Johnson have certainly made an immediate impact. He is at least as sharp a contrast to his predecessor as Theresa May looked to David Cameron in July/August 2016. In many ways, the difference is even more striking.

It was also difficult to assess in advance. The scale of the Cabinet reshuffle that followed on from the leadership election was much more brutal and extensive than had been anticipated. The degree of advanced planning made by the incoming victors on their entry to 10 Downing Street had not been expected either. It was far more intense than three years ago when the competition to take control of the Conservative Party was curtailed suddenly and unexpectedly by the withdrawal of Andrea Leadsom, leaving Mrs May and her closest circle of advisers a mere 48 hours to prepare for power. It also has to be acknowledged that (so far) Mr Johnson has been much more personally disciplined and meticulously “on message” than many observers would have contemplated. He has been much more like the figure who was Mayor of London from 2008-2016 than Foreign Secretary 2016-2018.

What are the early observations that can be made about the new regime and will they hold true?

The UK will leave the EU on October 31st unless the House of Commons blocks that outcome

A month ago, there was substantial reason to doubt how firm the Johnson commitment to be out of the EU on October 31 would prove in practise. He had, admittedly, made that result on that date his principal electoral commitment to his MPs and party members alike and made “do or die” his motto. Yet he had also argued that a UK departure without a deal was a “million to one shot” which did not sound like a scenario that he was enthusiastically embracing. The prospect of a further extension of Article 50 if that were needed to reach an accord with the EU-27 could not therefore be discounted.

The chances of that happening by the deliberate choice of this Prime Minister and this Government now look far less likely. We are close to the point where we can dismiss the notion that Mr Johnson might volunteer to the country that a different departure date was a sound idea. There appear to be only three credible outcomes today.

The first (still under-rated in my opinion) is that the UK and the EU-27 will come to an understanding about the terms of departure that will allow for it to take place on October 31 in a reasonably orderly manner. Whether that is by a full-blown amended version of the Withdrawal Agreement or by a more ad hoc and interim arrangement is to be determined (in theory at least there is more space between a “Deal” and a “No Deal” than might meet the eye).

The second (which the PM has every incentive to want everyone to believe) is that it will be a real “No Deal” divorce on October 31 with ministers being willing to risk the alleged consequences.

The third is that a majority in the House of Commons will act to prevent a No Deal severing of ties on October 31 either by a vote of no confidence or, somewhat more credibly, by legislating to compel that there is a further extension of Article 50 to allow more time for talks, a second referendum or an election. Of that trio, by far the most likely course of action would be an election this side of Christmas 2019.

In many ways, the Johnson style as PM is borrowed on Ronald Reagan’s tenure as President

The first month as Prime Minister has already demonstrated that Mr Johnson is most comfortable with the “Reagan Model” which served him well as Mayor of London. He sees his role as to set the priorities and the tone of the administration and leave others to do the details. He is the front-man with the core message and the daily appearances and photo opportunities to indicate to the public what he and his colleagues stand for. He is clearly not spending hours on policy micromanagement. Michael Gove really is in charge of no deal preparations. Dominic Cummings truly is in command of political strategy. Sir Edward Lister genuinely serves as the lead on international engagement. The senior leadership of the Cabinet have marching orders (“cut taxes” or “cut crime”) but rather more latitude on implementation than was the case under Mrs May as long as everything they seek to do is consistent and complementary to the overwhelming need for the UK to leave the EU on October 31. This will almost certainly remain the preferred Johnson means of doing business while he is PM.

There is, though, one important difference which may become more significant with time

One of the reasons that the Reagan Model worked in Washington in the 1980s (as it had when he was Governor of California previously) was that Mr Reagan had a very clear and coherent view of the world rooted in an upbeat brand of staunch conservatism. His ambitions were absolutely plain and philosophically rooted, namely substantial lower taxation, much smaller government and a much more assertive approach towards the Cold War. His subordinates did not need to ask themselves (or him) what he wanted in their spheres. It was entirely predictable what his aspirations would be.

Apart from Brexit, the same cannot be said about Mr Johnson. He is motivated rather more by his sense of instinctive populism than by ideological purity. He has flirted both with Thatcherism and “one nation conservatism” (itself a term of considerable elasticity). This ambiguity did not matter much when he was in charge of the capital city as the autonomy and authority of the Mayor is very limited, not encompassing much more than crime prevention, transport and planning. It could be an issue of considerable importance on the national stage, especially if and when we reach the moment that Brexit is less dominant in national life. There is the risk that ministers and advisors alike respond to this version of the Reagan Model by attempting to obtain what they think Mr Johnson wants (but do not know for certain) or think that he should want or simply what they want to see occurring. The danger is of destructive factionalism as rival camps of courtiers attempt to act in the king’s name.

There is a much more enthusiasm for social media innovation in Downing Street

Mr Cameron flirted with social media techniques but without a real zeal for them. He was a reluctant volunteer for Twitter. His first head of communications (Andy Coulson) came from a traditional newspaper background and his second (Craig Oliver) hailed from terrestrial television news. Both of them viewed social media as a “bolt-on” to a media approach rooted in long-established territory. Mrs May was if anything even more old school in approach with a fixation about The Daily Mail (the print version and not the rather more racy material that appears on its very successful website).

The new media team in Downing Street is much more innovative in its approach. It has elevated Facebook to a status akin to that of the press and television. Mr Cummings, in particular, has a passion for digital marketing and deep technology which was displayed with devastating effect in the 2016 referendum campaign when “Leave” were miles ahead of “Remain” in this regard. Now that he no longer has his column in The Daily Telegraph as his main media outlet, Mr Johnson appears set to become the most “new media” figure ever to serve in his office. It is a very fascinating development.

Absolutely everyone in the new Government expects an election sooner rather than later

The last shift in style of note to be explored here is the move towards an election campaign outlook. Absolutely everyone in the new Government expects there to be a relatively early election unless there is a massive shift in national sentiment which would make such a course of action suicidal. The list of options for when the hustings might be range from October (if the House of Commons were to resolve early next month to block a No Deal Brexit) to May, 2020 (to allow the impact of tax changes introduced in the Budget this year to have time to work their way into the pay packets of voters). In any case, the sense that the electorate will be consulted sooner rather than later has a serious effect on the psychology and actions of ministers, advisers and even the civil service. As of now, the Brexit effect is by far the largest force at work. It may not be long before election fever starts to eclipse it.

Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA


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