28 Nov 2018

Charge of the Light Brigade? Strategic and tactical issues for Theresa May in the coming weeks

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The contest is on. And what a strange one it is. For the next two weeks at least Theresa May has pledged to barnstorm the country seeking to appeal over the heads of parliamentarians to the public at large in the manner of a general election or referendum campaign.

Yet this is not an election or a referendum. The relationship between national sentiment, assuming that it can be stirred or shifted, and a vote in the division lobbies of the House of Commons is an extremely indirect one.

Added to this, her real opponents here are not Jeremy Corbyn and the Labour Party, who are playing the part in this saga that the UK’s somewhat curious constitutional arrangements has assigned to them – i.e. opposing without any obligation to offer a coherent alternative - but instead a large section of her own MPs who are supported by an unknown but definitely sizeable slice of the Conservative Party’s activists. It is all a bit surreal really. None of this is assisted by a certain ambiguity as to whether the argument for the deal that she has negotiated is that it is attractive or simply that the alternative is far worse.

On the face of it, this looks like a completely doomed exercise: a re-run of the Charge of the Light Brigade without the cavalry and cannons (one assumes). Yet it is such a novelty, an enterprise that so lacks a valid precedent with which to make a comparison, that it would be a mistake to write off the possibility that somehow, albeit at the second or even third attempt at Westminster, it works. To begin to imagine how it might do so, though, depends in large part on a set of strategic and tactical considerations as to how a Prime Minister may sell a product which does not seem to have a market.

So, what will be running through the minds of those at the heart of Mrs May’s campaign for a deal?

Have the lessons from 2017 been learnt?

The irony of the PM needing to run an election-style campaign for her EU deal is that her political situation is as difficult as it is largely because of the outcome of her last election campaign in 2017. If she had decided earlier in that year to roll the dice on 4 May then she would almost certainly have been rewarded with a thumping majority. If those numbers had been realised she would not have to bother herself about the Democratic Unionist Party and could tolerate rebellion in her ranks and still be in a position to move the required legislation through the House of Commons.

Her fatal delay in coming round to an early election meant that the contest itself was too long, drifted off Brexit and exposed her limitations as a politician. It was far too presidential, it took being ‘on message’ to the level that one might associate with a Dalek and was seen as aloof and arrogant (not least because of her refusal to debate the other party leaders).

Clearly, Downing Street has learnt some lessons. This will be a shorter enterprise and she plainly wants the chance to go head-to-head with Mr Corbyn (whether viewing figures will rival those of Strictly Come Dancing is contestable). Yet it will still end up being an extremely personal appeal if only because many in her Cabinet will want to keep their distance from it in case it ends in spectacular failure. Can she change herself to have more impact on the country this time around? Or, does she not seek to do so but try and make her liabilities assets?

Should she hold the vote in the House of Commons before the EU Council or defer to later?

The present plan is for the legislation required to enact the Withdrawal Agreement to come to the House of Commons in early December and, after several days of (doubtless inspiring) debate, for a vote to occur on 11 December, just before the EU Council scheduled for 14and 15 December.

If it is obvious that she does not have the votes that she needs in Parliament (and it is almost inconceivable that she turns her party around in a fortnight with nothing else to offer as an incentive) then do you hold the vote as planned or pull it? The advantage of holding the vote is that it forces your foes to put themselves on the record (and hence you discover for certain who they are), and a defeat may trigger the sort of meltdown on the stock exchange and a spectacular run on sterling that may shift minds for a second vote.

The disadvantages are that once individuals are formally recorded as having opposed you, it might be challenging for them to shift their stance after what might be only a modest extra argument to back the deal and, even more disturbingly for the PM, outright defeat could start a chain of events that suddenly leads to a confidence vote in her continued leadership of her party.

What might the EU Council meeting of 14 and 15 December yield?

What could the EU Council put on the table that would not involve amending the Withdrawal Agreement but could have a serious influence of the British debate over its departure? If such an item existed, would the EU’s leadership be prepared to flag it? Would sentiment simply harden? All of this in turn would come down to an assessment by the EU-27 as to whether a rabbit from a hat would do the trick anyway.

The one card which could be played that might move matters is this one: the EU could demonstrate, via a statement of intent, that if at any point the UK were to choose to be a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and as an EFTA member were to apply to be part of the European Economic Area (EEA), on either a temporary or a permanent basis, then the EU-27 would treat such a suggestion sympathetically.

This ‘Norway for Now’ notion is the closest thing that the Prime Minister, Government and Conservative Party has to a possible ‘Get Out Of Jail Free’ card. It would mean come June 2020, when a decision has to be taken as to whether a free trade agreement between the UK and the EU will or will not be ready by 31 December 2020 when the transition period is over, the UK could select not merely an extension of the transition or a move into the ‘backstop’ hated by many Conservative MPs, but could travel down the EFTA/EEA path too. This is an outcome that has advantages for the DUP, pro-Remain Tories and pro-Brexit MPs alike.

Should the ‘real’ vote be in late December or early January?

Depending on precisely what comes out of that EU Council, the Prime Minister then has to decide whether what would be billed as the final vote on the current Brexit deal should take place on or about 20 December or be deferred into early January. Ultimately, this will come down to a Whips estimate of whether she is now close enough to securing a majority to wager on the vote.

If she is plainly still short of the numbers needed, then the chances are that she will hold off until the first or even second week after the House of Commons returns from recess on 7 January 2019 in the hope that the passage of time and the paucity of rival options makes her deal look better. The danger in this approach is that deliberation moves on to the different ways in which a Hard Brexit is avoided (extending Article 50, an emergency package of measures to soften events after 29 March, or in some quarters a last-ditch drive for a snap second referendum) and her deal is just abandoned

When to contemplate human sacrifice?

The Prime Minister is entirely sincere in her desire to see this Withdrawal Agreement come to pass. She is also a political realist. It may well be that if there is nothing extra of substance that the EU can and will agree to propose as a ‘side letter’ to the main accord that Conservative MPs can embrace, then there is one only one remaining course of action that might allow her to carry the day.

This is to make it clear to Conservative MPs that she will stand down shortly after Brexit has occurred and that an internal election will determine what the Conservative Party’s position is as it enters ‘phase two’ of the negotiations. The prospect of a new leader almost certainly more inclined towards a Canada+++ settlement with the EU than Mrs May has been would represent a serious inducement for many Conservative MPs to gulp hard, swear they will never allow the backstop and enter the ‘Aye’ lobby.

Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA


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