13 Dec 2018

Decisively indecisive. A confidence vote outcome that does not settle very much

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Theresa May yesterday survived a vote of confidence in her leadership by a 200-117 vote margin. The size of her victory was a classic example of how political expectations can evolve in a very short period of time. At 8am yesterday, once the fact of the ballot had become known, winning 63% of the vote would probably have been seen as a solid performance. By 8pm yesterday, by contrast, the combination of what had appeared a very competent if frenzied campaign by her supporters, a high number of tweets in her favour by Conservative MPs, and a confident Prime Ministers Questions in the House of Commons had led the media to believe that she could contain dissent to less than 100 of her fellow MPs. As a consequence, the actual scale of the revolt was deemed to be significant.

As decisive indecision goes, one really has to hand it to the parliamentary Conservative Party. In the BVCA Insight published yesterday, it was suggested that there were two possible ‘benchmarks’ that might determine what was or was not a convincing victory. The first and softer one (thus likely to appeal to the pro-May camp) was her own performance in the final round of voting among MPs in the 2016 leadership election when she obtained 199 out of a possible 329 votes or 60.5%. The second and more demanding test (hence of more interest to her foes) was that of John Major in the leadership ballot of 1995 (which occurred at his instigation) where he nailed down 218 votes among Conservative MPs or 66.3% of the tally available.

The Conservative MPs who participated in the vote in Committee Room 14 of the House of Commons yesterday managed to back their leader but with 63.0914826498% of the vote (they could not even manage a round number) which almost precisely splits the difference between these two potential yardsticks. Hence we are left with a result that is a convincing victory if you are in favour of Mrs May’s continued tenure in 10 Downing Street but is less than a convincing triumph if you are not. This does not really settle very much one way or the other.

What explains the vote?

The reason why the number was as high as it was can probably be explained by the relatively tepid commitment that Mrs May made about her own future. She committed herself to not leading the Conservative Party into the next election – which could be as late as mid-2022 – but many of her own MPs wanted a firmer steer that she would not stay for more than a few months beyond the UK’s formal political departure from the EU still scheduled for 29 March 2019. This ballot means that while she cannot, under the rules of the Conservative Party, be ejected via such a vote for another 12 months, in reality she is highly unlikely to be party leader and Prime Minister as late as December 2019. It is entirely possible that she will not survive much beyond March 2019.

Why Mrs May was not more forthcoming is understandable. She did not want to render herself a lame duck by being too precise in her own words as to when she would leave office, although she was happy to have her associates be a little more forthcoming in private conversations with wavering MPs. She might also, by the time she addressed the 1922 Committee at about 5pm last night, have been a shade more confident about the result that she was about to get than she should have been. On reflection, stating that she would not serve beyond 2019 might have been better.

What next for Brexit?

In terms of the UK’s attempt to secure an orderly withdrawal from the EU the vote alters little. A much more emphatic victory might have tempted the EU-27 to offer a little more in terms of supplementary language to the current Withdrawal Agreement in the belief that the Prime Minister had the strength to return to Parliament next week and force such a package through the House of Commons. That does not seem to be the case.

Instead, there is little rationale in moving much beyond the direction that had already been indicated, namely producing language which adds more emphasis to the ‘Future Framework’ element of the Agreement, stressing that the EU-27 would want to move swiftly to conclude the negotiations on a free trade arrangement, and would much prefer to avoid a situation in which the UK had to enter the so-called ‘backstop’ to avoid a hard border between itself and the Republic of Ireland. This is of some value to Mrs May in her efforts to suppress internal dissent on the Withdrawal Agreement but of itself will not change the numbers. It is improbable that it could allow her to press Parliament for a positive vote next week.

What is more likely, therefore, is that she waits until early January before coming back to the House of Commons. What she might present then is a combination of a stronger parliamentary mechanism to allow MPs more influence in June 2020 over the choice between entering the backstop or opting for a further extension of the transition period, plus whatever the EU will put forward in terms of its own determination to avoid the backstop and, extremely reluctantly, a more explicit pledge about the timetable for her own departure than that she was willing to state publicly last night. That final element is a critical component in any strategy to allow the required legislation to be enacted. The question of policy towards the exit from the EU and the future leadership of the Conservative Party have now become utterly interconnected and are unlikely to be capable of separation from now on.

Will that be enough?

Whether even this package is enough is doubtful. Downing Street hopes that by running down the clock it can force its own MPs to accept that their realistic choice is between an improved deal of a form which they instinctively still have little enthusiasm for, or either No Deal or the risk that Brexit will not occur on the schedule that has been envisaged. That is possible but far from certain. It still may be the case that a revised version of what is still at core a very similar proposal to that which had to be abandoned in the House of Commons on Monday needs a different Prime Minister to sell it to what is an obviously deeply unhappy Conservative Party (and the Democratic Unionist Party).

In such conditions, sentiment within the Cabinet becomes critical. Senior ministers will feel not only emboldened but that they have an obligation to consider a Plan B if they calculate that a rebranded Plan A proposed by the Prime Minister will not carry the support of their own MPs. There is likely to be heightened interest over the Christmas/New Year period in two other possibilities. The first is an extension of Article 50 to allow for a ‘managed’ No Deal. The second is the concept of Norway Plus, namely the UK rejoining EFTA and through it the European Economic Area and supplementing this with a temporary customs arrangement with the EU that shadows the EU customs union for the duration of the arrangement.

The latter has some backing from different sections of the otherwise divided Conservative Party as a temporary solution, albeit for widely diverse reasons. It is not for the moment an option for which Mrs May has shown any favour, not least because it would mean the continuation of free movement which for her is a more important ‘red line’ than the ability of the UK to conduct and conclude free trade agreements as an autonomous economic actor.

So, in effect, the result of the no confidence vote is that the Prime Minister has until mid-January to formulate a new version of the Withdrawal Agreement, augmented by a hardened statement on her own future, that can be embraced by the House of Commons. If not, then the Cabinet is likely to insist on an alternative course of action, a move that would probably trigger her departure.

The two most crucial players around the Cabinet table are now Sajid Javid, the Home Secretary, and Jeremy Hunt, the Foreign Secretary, who are the two most plausible contenders from within the Cabinet to replace her should there be a contest and who enjoy a good personal relationship with each other. If they were to decide that whatever Mrs May intends to propose to Parliament simply will not obtain the necessary support of Conservative MPs and make a mutual threat to resign then, bluntly, she is finished.

If, on the other hand, they back her and lead a concentrated drive to bring enough MPs over the line with the cast iron promise that she will no longer be Prime Minister come the July summer recess, than there is a respectable chance that a version of Plan A will still carry the day.

Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA


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