11 Jul 2018

Divide and Rule? A week in which the disagreements in the Leave camp have ended in schism

ED912BAC-023B-4B08-92F1429A8ADA0D80.jpg

Much of the analysis and the debate after the announcement of the Chequers Statement and the subsequent resignation of, late on Sunday, David Davis as Brexit Secretary, and then, on Monday afternoon, Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary, has, understandably, focused on the Prime Minister and her future in office.

This is entirely legitimate. While Theresa May will probably survive any no confidence vote if the signatures can be found to force one on her, her decision to be the agent of a ‘soft Brexit’ probably means that she will cease to be in 10 Downing Street in about a year, once the UK’s legal exit from the EU is executed. She has become close to a slow-motion Captain Oates figure.

This, though, would probably have been the case whatever the wording of the Chequer’s Statement. What was not certain beforehand was whether and how the Leave camp would split between those in Government and those on the backbenches in the event of the Government opting decisively for ‘Switzada’ over ‘Canland’.

At one level, these two options, while obviously at alternative ends of a continuum between Switzerland and Canada as models for the UK’s ‘end state’ relationship with the European Union, are not enormously different in practice. Yet in more theoretical and symbolic terms there is a real distinction between them which is what has triggered howls of anger inside the parliamentary Conservative Party.

‘Switzada’ involves something akin to an Association Agreement between the UK and the EU not unlike the accord that the EU has today with Ukraine. ‘Canland’, by contrast, is an unusually sweeping Free Trade Agreement but still a Free Trade Agreement at core. One involves more institutional interdependence than the other. To use a business analogy, the first option is akin to as smaller company spinning out of a larger company and then agreeing to forge a legally-binding strategic partnership with it, while the second would see an atypically large contract signed to engage in commercial activities between the two firms but nothing as fixed as an alliance.

The end result of the emergence of ‘Switzada’ as the official Cabinet position and with collective responsibility restored in support of it is as follows. Before the Chequers outcome, it was broadly fair to state that the most important division in UK politics was the three-way split within the Cabinet between those who had been ‘Remain’, ‘Reluctant Remain’ and ‘Leave’ adherents at the time of the June 2016 referendum. After the Chequers outcome, the most significant schism is within the Leave fraternity between those who are not wild about ‘Switzada’, but think they can make it work to meet their ends (the Michael Gove stance), and those who simply do not wish to be associated with it at all considering ‘Switzada’ a betrayal of Brexit (the Davis thesis, echoed later by Johnson). Backbench Leave MPs will spend much of the summer deciding which sub-category to align with.

In many senses, this was all inevitable. By the standards of an advanced democracy, the Leave win in the referendum was an almost revolutionary act and revolutions have a habit of turning within as personality cults, factional intrigue and ideological purity arguments emerge in the aftermath of an unexpected victory. This happened with astonishing speed in June/July 2016 as the Johnson/Gove double-act disintegrated in less than a week with bitter recriminations all rounds. Matters seemed to have been patched up as what became the ‘Brexit Seven’ (Johnson, Gove, Davis, Liam Fox, Andrea Leadsom, Chris Grayling, Priti Patel then Penny Mordaunt) collaborated around the Cabinet table.

That unity has been broken once more as Mr Davis and Mr Johnson depart and Dominic Raab comes in (the new Brexit Secretary is personally and philosophically much closer to Mr Gove than to any of the others here) along with the somewhat obscure Geoffrey Cox as Attorney General. It is doubtful that the new version of the seven will act as a bloc, as those ready to allow ‘Switzada’ a go find themselves co-operating instead with those among their colleagues whose histories are with the ‘Reluctant Remain’ section (Sajid Javid, Jeremy Hunt, Esther McVey, Damian Hinds and Liz Truss).

For all of the fireworks, there are three fundamentals that should remain front of mind here.

Neither Mr Davis nor Mr Johnson are the political figures they once were

If Mr Davis had quit ‘on principle’ a year ago he would almost certainly have taken Mrs May down with him. If he had stormed out six months ago, it would still have had a massive, possibly terminal, impact on her prospects. Leaving this week, and very much in sorrow rather than anger, is something close to mutual relief.

He felt marginalised in his role, eclipsed by Olly Roberts, the civil servant who plainly has Mrs May’s ear on the negotiations with Brussels (although one suspects he too will have his wings clipped as Mr Raab, a very clever man with a Foreign Office background, asserts control). He also just seemed tired, which for a formerly high-energy figure was surprising. His explanation for his departure – namely that his heart was not in it – is, for once in these sort of conditions, credible.

The consequence of his decision was to leave the Foreign Secretary desperately exposed. He either stayed in office having once more, like on the Heathrow Airport vote, taken flight of principle or, with little enthusiasm, he had to depart the international arena (which he manifested loved) and return to the backbenches knowing full well that his chances of succeeding the Prime Minister have slumped.

On balance, staying put and coming across as the largest careerist in Christendom was unacceptable. Mrs May, borrowing from Lyndon Johnson’s famed remark about camping and urine aerodynamics, would rather have had him inside the tent aiming out but her strategic decision two years ago that her best option was to appoint him as Foreign Secretary and let him damage himself has worked.

Mr Gove is now the central player in the Cabinet Brexit calculations

What Mrs May could not have endured was Mr Gove’s resignation from her administration. To have both the de facto Chairman and Chief Executive of the Leave campaign denounce her preferred plan for Brexit would be an impossible situation. Added to this are a series of factors that have rendered the Environment Secretary an absolutely central figure.

First, he is a plausible contender to be the next Conservative Party leader and hence Prime Minister. Second, he is very well regarded by a wide range of his colleagues in Cabinet and Parliament including some staunch Remain supporters (such as Nicky Morgan, the ex-Education Secretary). Third, as a former senior figure at The Times who was and is very close to Rupert Murdoch and who also is intimately interconnected with the Daily Mail high command, whether he is in or out on ‘Switzada’ has far wider ramifications than is true for technically considerably more senior figures such as the Chancellor or the Home Secretary. With his close associate Mr Raab succeeding Mr Davis, Mr Gove is the irreplaceable man of this government.

The Government has settled on a reasonably plausible Brexit blueprint most of its MPs will back

The rattle of red boxes being exchanged has drowned out, in part, the significance of the Chequers statement. The Government will, with the publication of its White Paper imminently, actually have cards on the table. The combination of the proposed ‘backstop’ on the Irish border - involving full UK participation in the common external tariff element of the customs union in these circumstances - and regulatory alignment on agri-foods all but solves the Irish border impasse over the withdrawal.

The existence of ‘Switzada’ allows for some high-level agreement on the future formula for EU-UK relations to be reached before the end of this year. That permits Brexit to take place in March 2019 in a reasonably orderly manner. There is nothing else on the political menu that allows for this. The alternatives are some version of ‘No Deal’ (which only the hardest of hard Brexiteers actively wants and could imagine working well) or a ‘No Brexit’ (due to parliamentary stalemate, a need to extend Article 50 or a second referendum). This, in the end, will leave Conservative MPs with little choice.

Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA


×

Update your login details

We updated our website and supporting systems on 12th December. 

If you previously had an account, please reset your password. If it's your first-time logging in, please register to create an account. For assistance, please contact the BVCA Membership Team

Login