11 May 2016

Fiftysomething politics. The scale of a Remain victory is crucial to what happens afterwards

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The referendum campaign has not been short of dramatic rhetoric. Last week, David Cameron implied that a decision to leave the European Union could trigger World War III and hence the possibility of a nuclear apocalypse. On Sunday, his chief foe, Boris Johnson, hinted that if the UK were to opt to stay in the EU then it would be complicit in a project for the European continent which is only modestly more benign that those pursued by Napoleon and Hitler. There is still five more weeks to go of this hyperbole. Plenty of time for a revival of the Black Death or the risk of a massive meteorite strike destroying planet Earth to be wheeled out by one side or the other.

The language is so stark (and, frankly, so ludicrous) because the stakes are so high for the principal protagonists. Mr Cameron and the ex-Mayor of London are looking as much at the five weeks, five months or five years after 23 June 2016 as they are the five weeks running up to the referendum. Both of them appreciate that this is not a simply binary political occasion. It is not enough for the Remain campaign (especially) to win, it is the margin of victory which will be politically vital. And as no one believes that the margin would be as much as 60%-40% in favour of staying in, then what this means in practice is, unless the underdog Leave team prevails, this is about fiftysomething politics. The consequences for the Conservative Party, hence the Government and thus the country as well as the UK’s relationship with the EU, turn crucially on whether the Remain tally is nearer to 51% or 59%.

The 50.1%-52.5% scenario

A narrow victory with a Remain margin of five percentage points or less would be a nightmare for the Prime Minister. It would mean that England has probably opted to detach itself from the EU but had been outvoted by a stronger combined Scottish/Welsh/Northern Ireland vote to remain. Even if that were not true, then it is almost certain that England minus London would have opted for out but the capital city (not considered ‘real Britain’ by many on the centre-right these days) had thrown its lot in with the other components of the UK to stay inside.

It may well mean that those born within the UK had chosen the exit route (albeit only just) while those born elsewhere had backed Brussels by a large enough majority to be decisive. It would mean that the additional financial firepower that the Remain camp had secured via the now infamous 16-page official case for staying in the EU would be cited as having swung the outcome in an unfair fashion. It would also indicate that the majority of Conservative Party activists, members and ordinary voters had preferred that Britain left the EU.

All of this would be, to put it mildly, toxic stuff within the House of Commons. The chances of the 50 Conservative MPs (15% of the 330 such MPs in total) required to force a formal leadership challenge to the Prime Minister would be very high. The objective of such an exercise would not be to displace Mr Cameron immediately (he would be unlikely to lose such a ballot) but instead to demonstrate a degree of discontent which would render any thoughts that he might have of remaining in his office until late 2019 or even 2020 to enhance the chances of a successor of his own stripe implausible.

It would also set the terms for the reshuffle anticipated shortly after the referendum with the PM all but compelled to put at least one of Mr Johnson or Michael Gove at the highest rank of the Cabinet. In contrast, George Osborne would find himself a deeply devalued Chancellor of the Exchequer. He and Mr Cameron would find themselves in a de facto coalition which left them pining for Nick Clegg. The overall agenda of the administration would shift sharply to the right and while the UK would be still in the EU the possibility of a second referendum after the 2020 election could not be dismissed. When Mr Cameron does finally stand down (in 2017 or 2018) a Brexit advocate would succeed him.

The 52.5%-55% outcome

A Remain win of between five and 10 percentage points would be a no-mans-land outcome. It would be unlikely in such a situation that England had been compelled to stay in the EU by the other sections of the UK, although if it were 53% rather than 55% it is possible that London would have been decisive. It would be similarly harder to assert the votes of immigrants had been crucial. The complaints about the conduct of the campaign and the financial disparity between the two sides in the campaign would undoubtedly still be aired but whether they would be credible is contestable. The notion of a second referendum within the next few years would also seem less than compelling. For all these reasons, Mr Cameron would be in a better place politically than in the narrow scenario.

He would still, though, have a huge problem with party management. Not only would some 40% of his MPs have endorsed Brexit but with less than 55% of the overall vote it would probably be the case that a slender majority of Conservative voters had rejected continued EU membership. With a majority of merely 12 inside the House of Commons, he would need to appease some of his critics.

This would strengthen the argument for a very swift ‘reconciliation reshuffle’. Philip Hammond would probably be moved out of his position as Foreign Secretary in favour of someone seen as being on the more sceptical side of the Remain campaign, such as Theresa May. The next Home Secretary would probably be Mr Johnson or Mr Gove and whichever one it was not would also be offered senior status inside the Cabinet.

All of the remaining Leave cabinet ministers would keep their slots with the probable exception of John Whittingdale (offered the chance to spend more time with his intriguing private life) but in the interests of balance his replacement would almost certainly be a Leave figure. A reshuffle of this sort would probably be enough to deter even a symbolic ballot on the leadership question. An extremely uneasy peace would occur for the rest of the Cameron era.

The 55%-57.5% result

This is the territory in which it is easiest for the Prime Minister to return to pre-referendum politics. He would have won decisively but his opponents would not have been absolutely humiliated. Any complaints about the contest having been won by the Scots, Welsh or Irish, Londoners, migrants or by an outrageous monetary advantage would be essentially redundant. A majority of Conservative voters would probably have backed Mr Cameron and possibly a majority of Tory members as well. Mr Johnson would not have blown his chance of the leadership entirely but would definitely need time to rebuild his battered reputation. There would almost certainly be an implosion within UKIP.

The reshuffle which then followed would be one where the PM held almost all of the cards. He could choose whomever he liked for the most important Cabinet portfolios. Mr Gove would either stay at Justice or move sideways to be Leader of the House of Commons. Mr Cameron would probably opt to have Mr Johnson inside the tent speaking Latin out rather than the other way round but from the post of Culture Secretary, rather than something more politically sizeable. The remaining advocates of Leave could be eased out of the Cabinet with but one of their replacements being of the same ilk. The notion of a leadership challenge would be ridiculous and Mr Cameron could choose the time of his departure as he would wish, playing it long if that assisted Mr Osborne (the state of the economy rather than the EU or any other factor would then become fundamental to his ambitions to be PM). British politics could return to ‘normal’ and the focus may shift back to the fate of the Labour Party.

The 57.5% plus rout

Mr Cameron can sack all his enemies if he likes, stay until May 2020, and Boris hits junk bond status.

Tim Hames, Director General, BVCA


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