23 Aug 2017

French Disconnection: Macron’s slump in polling at home may prove permanent and significant

AEAFEEE1-8851-419B-A325F7FEA6E5B8A6.jpg

The major story of European politics in the first half of 2017 was the improbable rise of Emmanuel Macron to capture the presidency of France and then see a set of his supporters secure a sizeable majority in the parliamentary elections shortly afterwards. It may be, however, that the most important story of the second half of this year is his dramatic decline in popularity and inability to control domestic politics despite what appears to be a dominant position.

The President reached the symbolic (but otherwise somewhat irrelevant) moment of his 100 days in office on Monday, only to receive the news that his approval rating had fallen to 36%, substantially lower than that of his hapless predecessor François Hollande at the same point in his tenure and on a par with Donald Trump. What is worse still is that while Mr Hollande had begun with a tad under 52% of the popular vote on the second round in his victory, Mr Macron had started with 66% of the vote in his triumph.

The reasons for this relatively rapid decline in support are many without one principal explanation. The new President assumed power as an extremely inexperienced political figure and this has been obvious. He initially stated that he would operate as a ‘Jupiter’ figure, focusing only on the most important issues for France at home and abroad, and would leave the day-to-day ‘details’ to his Prime Minister, Édouard Philippe - a fellow technocrat and former Mayor of Le Havre who he had recruited from the centre-right camp - and his Cabinet, and would not allow short-term criticism to divert the administration from its longer-term mission. In reality, though, he has contradicted and overruled his ministers at the slightest sign of trouble. This has not enhanced his own standing.

There have been a series of arguably unnecessary clashes that have alienated the electorate. These range from introducing housing benefit cuts and defence spending reductions (which led to the resignation of the most senior military figure in France), alongside an increase in the taxation on cigarettes at the same time as insisting, against the preference of his Prime Minister, on pressing ahead with sharp cuts in taxes on business and the wealthy. These policy spats, which one might view pragmatically as the essence of politics, have been supplemented by suggestions of an aloof approach to public administration (summoning parliament to Versailles to admonish it for example) and an unseemly dispute as to whether or not his wife was to be formally styled as the ‘First Lady’.

A lot of this could, quite reasonably, be dismissed as simply the growing pains of a new government, especially when it involves a 39-year old President and a completely untested political movement. It might also be argued that the fundamentals of the approach which the President embraces, namely serious deficit reduction rooted in spending control and rendering France more competitive in terms of taxation and by labour market reform, are eminently defensible and if implemented will be seen as positive by the time of the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Spring 2022. But there are also solid grounds for suspecting that this sharp decline in support might prove to be permanent.

Macron was elected for who he was not rather than who he is

Mr Macron was arguably the most fortunate politician in French history. With merely a brief spell as Minister of the Economy and Finances as his background, and starting in single figures in the polls when he launched his campaign, he won because he was not Mr Hollande and thus benefited as the Socialist Party campaign totally collapsed. He then surged because François Fillon, rather than the initial favourite Alain Juppé, became the contender for the mainstream centre-right, only for him then to be engulfed by accusations of improper payment from public funds to his wife and children. After that Mr Macron found himself with around a quarter of the vote on round one up against Marine Le Pen, and hence the candidate of the whole of the establishment, whatever it might think about his own qualities.

All of this indicates that Mr Macron’s base or core of support is actually unusually low (at most 20-25% of the electorate) and may prove to be exceptionally fragile if the political going gets tough. That moment could arrive very shortly as the trade unions in France (a robust bunch who know the taste of blood) seek to resist the labour law changes that the National Assembly has delegated to the Cabinet the right to impose as much as they wish. There is the risk if the President is not careful that the Left will abandon him for introducing the measures in the first place, while the Right will desert him at the first sign of him compromising over his package. In such circumstances, a 36% approval rating could turn out to be a ceiling rather than a floor and leave him in an irrecoverable position.

It is still unclear what ‘Macronism’ is or what the En Marche movement actually stands for

The President is widely described as a ‘centrist’, as is the En Marche movement that now holds 350 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly. In this case, the ‘centre’ is not a point that is equidistant from the Left and the Right respectively. It is instead an amalgam of the two plus one other factor. In so far as coherent ideological analysis can be applied, the President and his allies are centre-left on constitutional and cultural causes while centre-right on economic and management matters, and staunchly pro-European in foreign policy (although precisely what that means is not clear). As an alliance, it is one that spans David Miliband, Vince Cable and George Osborne. The possibility of it all ending in tears or simply falling apart is obvious. The President could find himself with a nominal majority in the National Assembly but without the direction and discipline to operate effectively.

There is a precedent for what might happen

The Macron phenomena is novel but not unique. A version of it was witnessed before in the rise and fall of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the President from 1974 to 1981. He too was a smart technocrat who started aligned with a mainstream political entity (the Gaullists) with whom he served as Minister of the Economy and Finances, but split to create his own party/fan club (the Independent Republicans). After a stretch out of office he exploited divisions elsewhere to win the presidential election held after the death of Georges Pompidou with the backing of a somewhat vague alliance known as the ‘Reforming Movement’. He too tacked to the right on the economy but the left on cultural politics (liberalising the laws on abortion, divorce and homosexuality) and was far more pro-EEC (as it was) than General de Gaulle had been. For a while, it seemed that he had carved out a space between the traditional left and right blocs, but when the economy slowed in 1979 that room soon disappeared. He fended off a challenge from the right (Jacques Chirac) in 1981 only to lose to François Mitterrand.

Why does any of this matter?

The EU has so far enjoyed a much better 2017 than 2016. For this to continue, nevertheless, the Macron presidency has to be successful at home and hence be a significant factor in EU politics. If it becomes bogged down domestically, then it will not be influential elsewhere. With a potentially unpredictable, indeed volatile, Italian election due within the next 12 months, the EU could find itself back in a state of crisis with Angela Merkel again the only figure of any substantial authority.

This would have an impact on an array of matters ranging from how to handle the Brexit discussion to the attempt to create a foreign policy of its own which is detached from the Trump White House. The Macron victory looked, to some at least, as if it could be the political equivalent of a ‘Get Out of Jail Free’ card. It still might. Yet it is as possible that it may prove to be a new version of the Hollande era. A French President notionally in command of everything but in practice in control of very little.

Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA



×

Update your login details

We updated our website and supporting systems on 12th December. 

If you previously had an account, please reset your password. If it's your first-time logging in, please register to create an account. For assistance, please contact the BVCA Membership Team

Login