Myth, Positioning and Paradox. The role of the manifesto in British political life

This week has emerged as manifesto week in the 2017 election. The parties have, of course, been trailing many of their policies for some time, and in the case of the Labour Party an entire draft of their manifesto was leaked in advance of the official launch, but their publication will still be seen, by the media at least, as a significant moment both in the contest itself and what comes afterwards.
That attention is legitimate but limited in its value. Manifestos are not the equivalent of the Ten Commandments. They serve as much to limit the room for manoeuvre for politicians and parties afterwards as they allow for the opportunity for policy innovation. While documents of this form have long been the norm in almost all democracies, they have a longer history in the UK than for anywhere else in the world and for reasons to be outlined here have evolved a constitutional status that is almost certainly unique. Yet the essence of them is that of myth, positioning and paradox.
Myth
Manifestos have the importance that they enjoy in the United Kingdom because, like so much of our arrangements, they have acquired an authority and a status over time that is largely accidental. The manifesto is the essence of the ‘doctrine of mandate’ which, combined with an essentially two-party system and the single plurality (or ‘first-past-the-post’) electoral system, explains why a government that commands a majority in the House of Commons can verge upon being an elective dictatorship.
The myth that allows this to occur is that the voter, when casting their ballot paper for a particular political party, is offering an informed and unambiguous endorsement of all of the policy proposals of that party as set out in their manifesto. That endorsement creates a virtual obligation on the House of Commons to accept the fundamental principles of any subsequent legislation which flows from a manifesto commitment (no matter how vague the wording might be), leaving little room for MPs to do anything more than debate the details. It has also meant that the House of Lords is in a far, far weaker position to challenge such legislative initiatives than it would be for non-manifesto matters.
A case in point this time is the suggested partial re-introduction of grammar schools. Despite the evident enthusiasm for the Prime Minister to allow for experimentation here, received wisdom at 9am on 18 April (the morning when it turned out the election would, in effect, be called) was that it was extremely unlikely that this measure would be enacted before 2020. It was vulnerable because the government had a small majority in the House of Commons and was thus a hostage to a revolt by some Conservative MPs against the idea. Even if that dissent could be overcome it was thought to be set for an ambush in the House of Lords where it is nowhere close to a majority because of the strength of opposition and the fact that this policy were not mentioned at all in the 2015 manifesto.
By 9am on the morning of 18 June (the day before the Queen’s Speech), however, the prospects of legislating for this change will have moved from ‘extremely unlikely’ to ‘virtually inevitable’. This is partly because the Conservative majority appears set to increase, but mostly because the proposal is in the Conservative manifesto this time which means that in parliamentary terms it will benefit from the doctrine of mandate. There may be many Conservative MPs who still do not think the notion is particularly wise but few will publicly oppose it. The House of Lords may hate it but will not block it.
Yet the idea that every single person who votes Conservative on 8 June will have diligently read the manifesto and explicitly or implicitly agreed with every sentence in it, thus obliging the Parliament to enact the legislation which flows from it, is obviously, to borrow a word which Conservative HQ is fond of applying to Jeremy Corbyn, ‘nonsensical’. It is, to put it mildly, a myth. To use a harsher term, it is bollocks. Despite this, a policy that has the fortune to be in the manifesto of a winning political party in the UK will almost certainly become law unless the Government itself changes its mind.
Positioning
The sort of manifesto that emerges at any election campaign – whether it is long or short, thematic or detailed, devised to reach out to new voters or designed to shore up existing constituencies – is strongly correlated to expectations of the election itself. Elections in which there is a clear favourite produce different sorts of political calculations than those which look more closely contested.
There are differences in approach, though, in whether the party that appears to be the front-runner is an Opposition that seems to be poised to assume office (the Conservatives in 1979, Labour in 1997, and to a lesser degree the Conservatives in 2010) or whether it is the incumbent governing party that looks headed for another term by a sizeable margin (the Conservatives in 1983, Labour in 2001 and slightly less so Labour in 2005). Similarly, the style of manifesto that is likely to be adopted by the party that seems destined to lose the election will vary as to whether or not it is in government.
Put crudely, this division works thus. If it is an ‘out’ party that is confident of winning the election then all the incentives are to do nothing in a manifesto that might put off the voters who have most recently been attracted to them and instead focus on a small number of policies known to have a wide appeal and which are hence ‘safe’.
If it is an ‘in’ party that believes it is about to be endorsed again then the political logic lies in seeking to secure as close as possible to a ‘blank cheque’ but with a few potentially contentious items smuggled in to the specifics so that the doctrine of mandate can be applied to them. These more risky policies are then enacted first to get them out of the way. It is also this scenario in which a political party is most likely to have the confidence to conduct policy raids on enemy territory, as Theresa May is doing on energy price caps, council housing and workers’ rights because it believes it can reach out to new voters without fear of losing some existing support.
Meanwhile, if a governing party appears to be on the way out then (as in 1997 or 2010), it will know that the chances of a political recovery through new policy ideas are slim. The whole strategy has to be one of emphasising the risks involved in letting the other side in, not the virtues of ministers. By contrast, opposition parties that seem to be staring defeat in the face are the ones historically most prone to lengthy manifestos with a substantial number of policy commitments in the hope that (a) having lots of policies proves that it is ready for power, (b) shoring up its core vote by showering the voters closest to the party with pledges so that they will turn out on polling day, and (c) a (desperate) hope that some of these policies will draw in extra backing. Labour in 2017 fits this pattern perfectly.
There are some exceptions to this rule. The Conservatives in 1987 wanted to rebut an argument that they were ‘running out of steam’ and so produced an unusually detailed list of policy proposals for a governing party that seemed set for a third term (the Poll Tax was an unfortunate by-product of this approach). The Conservative manifesto in 2005 (authored by a young David Cameron) was atypically short and thematic, reflecting their dilemma as to whether to lean right or compete for the centre.
Paradox
The paradox of all this is that most of the issues which make or break a government after an election are not in manifesto territory. The defence of the Falklands Islands in 1982 came from nowhere. The ERM crisis of September 1992 was a similar earthquake. The response to the 9/11 terrorist attack and subsequent decision to be part of the invasion of Iraq were not in the 2001 Labour manifesto. The 2005 Labour manifesto was silent as to what to do if there were a global financial crisis. The promise to hold a referendum on EU membership was in the 2015 Conservative manifesto but merely repeated a pledge that Mr Cameron had chosen to make in January 2013 which would come back to haunt him.
At this election, Brexit is the central question. Yet whether or not it can be made to work or not will depend at least as much on the approach of the EU-27 and the European Council, Commission and Parliament. Not on a word on that will be or can be set out in the party manifestos.
Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA