Recess Politics. How ministers will seek to deal with Brexit while their own MPs are missing

Most people enjoy their summer holiday. Ministers of the Crown have special reasons to welcome them. As of last night, the House of Commons went into its recess. The House will not return until Tuesday, 4 September and will adjourn again after seven sitting days on Thursday, 13 September to allow for the party conference season and will hence not be back on the green benches properly until Monday, 9 October when, with the exception of an odd mini-break in November, they will be sitting all the way until Thursday, 20 December. Even those seven days in September will not be of any consequence if the Whips have their way with them.
To encourage Conservative MPs to stay in their constituencies (or anywhere other than Westminster where they might cause trouble), it is safe to assume that the schedule will be very light with few if any votes of real substance. This would be the perfect time to set two days aside to deal with the Traffic Lights (Colours of) Bill, to debate our future relationship with Paraguay and Peru or for a lengthy General Debate on hot weather. The last thing in the world that the Government will want is anything that stirs the pot about Brexit. The next serious internal battle in that particular war will be fought out at the Conservative Party conference.
It cannot really be said that the parliamentary session ended with much of a bang yesterday. In the main chamber, members did admittedly start with Oral Questions on Health and Social Care, but from there moved to a Ten-Minute Rule Motion on Civil Aviation (Accessibility), then a Motion on the Third Report of Session 2017-2019 from the Committee on Standards, which teed up a General Debate on ‘Matters to be considered before the forthcoming Adjournment’, and then the final Adjournment session itself on first tier tribunals, section 24 powers and enforcement on freeholders.
Matters were as low-key elsewhere. In Westminster Hall (the subsidiary debating chamber of the House which has existed since 1997 but made very little impact on national life) there were debates on ‘The remit of the Office of Budget Responsibility’, ‘Train services to and from Preston Park’ and ‘Family Hubs’. The only Public Bill Committee meeting was considering the Offensive Weapons Bill, which is plainly an important topic but not one where there is bitter party division. All this apparent inactivity in Westminster disguised the fact that yesterday was a hyperactive one in Whitehall. No fewer than 21 written ministerial statements were released (which could well be a record number), covering a wide range of sizeable subjects but all of them timed to minimise parliamentary scrutiny.
So, by far the most important action to occur in the Palace of Westminster on the last day of term was the joint appearance of Dominic Raab, the new Secretary of State at the Department for Exiting the European Union, and Oliver Robbins, the Prime Minister’s Europe Adviser, to offer oral evidence to the Brexit Select Committee. The new written ministerial statement that the Prime Minister was taking “personal charge” of the Brexit negotiations (which some of us have long informed that she was in charge of anyway) added to the significance of the two men answering questions side-by-side.
This was really interesting (to professional Brexit-watchers such as myself) in three regards. The first was the body language. When David Davis, the ex-Brexit Secretary, used to appear in public with Mr Robbins (which was not often) it was obvious that he loathed him and equally obvious that Mr Robbins considered Mr Davis to be insufficiently important to be worthy of loathing. By contrast, Mr Raab and Mr Robbins at least produced the impression of being on the same team.
Second, although Mr Raab has only held his seals of office for a shade over two weeks he was manifestly more willing to discuss detail (if he had to) than his predecessor had ever been. Finally, both Mr Raab and Mr Robbins managed to stick to the script which has to be employed by them at this stage of the negotiations: that they were absolutely determined to avoid a ‘no deal’ outcome but were at the same time ramping up preparations for one.
This is not an easy message to get right. Any hint of a ‘no deal’ scenario would rightly be regarded with horror by almost everyone within the business community, but ministers cannot afford to let Brussels believe that they will put up with absolutely any old deal, no matter how unfavourable it was, to avoid a ‘no deal’ situation.
What really matters in this phase of the dialogue while the House of Commons is mostly side-lined?
Both sides really, really do not want a ‘no deal’ outcome
Neither the UK Government nor the European Commission need any further reminder that it would be a very bad situation indeed if the UK simply left the EU on 29 March 2019. It would be chaos. No amount of prior preparation would be adequate. It would be carnage at ports (especially) on both sides of the English Channel. The Irish border would instantly revert to being a hard border. It would be very hard to salvage matters afterwards and have any kind of orderly return to negotiations later. It would be the sort of horror show divorce that one customarily associates with Hollywood actors.
Which is why it is exceedingly unlikely to happen by design but could only occur as Jeremy Hunt, the new Foreign Secretary put it in Berlin on Monday, “by accident”. That accident would inflict the most damage on the UK but would deprive the EU of the £39 billion that it is anticipating in revenues from the UK between 29 March 2019 and 31 December 2020. That would be a big hit to absorb. For that reason, although the media will puff it up endlessly, a ‘no deal’ end state is most unlikely.
The two sides are not that far apart on the Withdrawal Agreement language
The sticking point now is exactly what the language should be on the so-called ‘backstop’ option for the Irish border if it could not be resolved by other means before 1 January 2021. The UK has set out a plan involving the whole of the UK remaining within that aspect of the EU Customs Union that relates to the Common External Tariff.
It cannot be said that Brussels is full of fervour for this notion but at no stage has it categorically rejected it. Rationally it should (and will) respond by demanding a set of guarantees that the UK would not exploit this theoretical backstop so as to re-enter the whole of the single market by stealth without the obligation to accept free movement. Or, put differently, the backstop has to have a further backstop so that it does not become the UK’s secret front-stop. Finding the exact language to secure that end is not straightforward but it is not mission impossible.
If all else failed, extending Article 50 is still an option
If, as Mr Hunt put it, the fear here is of a no deal “by accident” then there is an airbag available. If the sense was that the two sides were making progress towards the Withdrawal Agreement but were at risk of being defeated solely by the ticking of the clock, then Article 50 allows for an extension by the unanimous consent of all concerned.
It is a prospect that is being played down by the UK and the EU at the moment because it would be enormously embarrassing and controversial for Theresa May (as it would strongly imply that she had mistimed the original decision to start the clock in March 2017) and merely conceding the possibility now that it might be done risks defusing the urgency that the existing timetable has for compelling the settlement to be completed. But if all else failed and the alternative to adding six months to the schedule was an ugly accidental ‘no deal’, it would be done.
There is much then to keep ministers busy while the House of Commons is in recess. The biggest political calculation they have to make is not about the Withdrawal Agreement but the timing on reaching an accord about the ‘Future Framework’. Do they also want that done by the EU Council in October or would it prove too toxic within the parliamentary Conservative Party? Might it be better to wait until the December Council to conclude it? That Council is on 13 and 14 December. A deal struck then would be presented to the House of Commons by the PM on Monday, 17 December which is, maybe conveniently, three days before the House is due to rise for the Christmas recess.
Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA