Reshuffle result. A seemingly ‘change, but no change’ Cabinet change that could cause change
Reshuffles are a distinctly British political exercise. Other countries have them but less frequently and more of necessity than out of choice. They are highly disruptive. They inevitably wander off script when those informed about their future assignments disagree with the assessment. They add to the instability of public administration in the UK and, along with a recent tendency to rotate civil servants in major departments on a regular basis, reinforce the generalist atmosphere and character in Whitehall whom many would compare unfavourably with more specialist systems elsewhere. There is little evidence that they lead to more effective or more popular governments. On any sort of rational cost-benefit analysis they would be undertaken quite rarely. This is not, alas, to be the case.
Theresa May’s Cabinet reshuffle illustrates all of the above. The enforced loss of Damian Green as First Secretary of State and de facto Deputy Prime Minister just before Christmas meant that some change within the Cabinet was unavoidable. She thus had a choice between a minimalist move, a broader switch of responsibilities, or the sort of wholesale recasting of the Cabinet that was witnessed in July 2016 when she assumed control of 10 Downing Street from David Cameron.
She went for the middle option having ended 2017 on a relative high through the agreement with the EU that ‘sufficient progress’ had been made on the terms for the UK’s exit in March 2019 that discussions could now move on to the transition period and then the final settlement. She therefore felt strong enough to conduct a reshuffle that would demonstrate enhanced authority. She did not, though, want to alter the balance of voices over Brexit around the Cabinet table that much, nor create too many new enemies on the backbenches in a House of Commons where she does not command an outright majority. She also wanted the focus to be on domestic issues of real concern to the voters and not exclusively about the ‘who thinks what’ in terms of the UK-EU relationship.
It did not work out quite as expected. One Cabinet member (Jeremy Hunt) was determined to stay in his original position rather than become the Business Secretary and he succeeded in that objective. Another one (Justine Greening) was equally resolved not to be switched from Education to Work and Pensions and when the Prime Minister would not back down, she quit of her own disposition. The net result was that while three individuals left the Cabinet (in addition to Mr Green who had already departed), none of them was actually fired by the Prime Minister in an assertion of force. One (James Brokenshire) left for health reasons. Another (Patrick McLoughlin) went voluntarily. A third (Ms Greening) stormed out when Mrs May wanted her to stay and stole most of the headlines.
A further irony is the identity of the three individuals who acquired departmental portfolios. Esther McVey, the new Work and Pensions Secretary, and Matt Hancock, the new Culture Secretary, were protégés of George Osborne, hardly the Prime Minister’s closest ally. Damian Hinds, now at Education, was also first brought into office at the behest of the ex-Chancellor, although he is more detached from him. In two cases, Sajid Javid and Jeremy Hunt, Cabinet ministers stayed put but their departments were renamed to be those of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and Health and Social Care respectively.
Overall, with four people leaving (including Mr Green), all of whom campaigned for Remain in 2016, and four people arriving (including Brandon Lewis as Conservative Party Chairman), all of whom campaigned for Remain in 2016, it is understandable that the wider world might think (if it deemed the subject worth consideration at all) that this was a ‘change, but no change’ reshuffle which if it did anything at all merely begged the question as to why anyone decided to bother with it.
As is often the case in politics, however, matters are more subtle than that. There are three areas (at least) in which this reshuffle might lead to a difference in the way the Cabinet will now function.
The Green to Lidington switch is not a like-for-like move entirely
As noted, with the exception of the Green to Lidington swap, the top tier of the Cabinet has not altered and the overall number of ex-Remainers versus ex-Leavers has not moved either. This might leave the impression that the balance of forces in the Brexit debate is identical. In truth, it has not been transformed but it will not be exactly the same. Mr Green and Ms Greening were hard core Remainers, convinced that Brexit is a major policy mistake and determined to do all they could to limit the damage (as they saw it) even if that meant a public fight with backbench Conservative MPs. They were definitely for ‘Switzada’ or better still ‘Norway-lite’ if they had a chance of obtaining it.
The new Cabinet line-up reduces this faction in strength and increases those who were relatively unenthusiastic Remainers in 2016, who are now party pragmatists, the middle contingent in the government, who want to be seen as faithfully implementing the referendum result (not trying to undermine it) and who place a high priority on finding an outcome that almost all Conservative MPs can endorse. As the Cabinet is of more of a Remain hue than the parliamentary party as a whole (never mind the wider Conservative membership), this more emollient approach implies that those who want the closest possible relationship with EU after the transition period ends, notably the Chancellor and the Home Secretary, may find fewer voices at lower volumes in support of them.
The creation of the Department of Health and Social Care could well prove to be significant
Although it seems to have happened almost by accident through Mr Hunt’s passionate insistence that he should remain at the helm at Health and have social care under his empire too, what has occurred has the potential to be significant. There is a big challenge at the core of social policy in the UK in that the National Health Service (solely funded from the centre and with its budget protected in real terms since 2010) is institutionally separated from social care (partly funded by local councils and where there have been substantial expenditure reductions over the past eight years). The two do not interconnect efficiently in many parts of the country. NHS beds are essentially blocked while cash-strapped local authorities look for alibis to delay taking on responsibility (and hence payment) for people who logically should move out of the health service in to social care. Finding a means to end this division has long been something of a Holy Grail for those who attempt to manage these matters. Putting the Department of Health squarely in charge of social care is not an end in itself but it may be a means to that end. If so, this otherwise strange reshuffle might have been worth holding.
Tim Hames
Director General, BVCA
