Six Months On: Aftershocks of EU referendum result on UK politics still emerging

When asked in 1972 about the impact of the French Revolution of 1789, Chou En Lai, then Chinese Premier, reportedly said that it was “too early to say”. Somewhat sadly, this epic line may have been the result of mistranslation and misunderstanding as it is possible that he thought that he was being asked about the impact of the ‘Paris Spring’ of 1968 – the failed student-led uprising – in which case his caution in offering an answer is much more comprehensible. In the case of the EU referendum, which was held exactly six months ago as of tomorrow, it really is too soon to tell and this will almost certainly still be true four years hence, although one hopes that it might be fully appreciated at some point before the 183 years that passed between 1789 and Mr Lai’s supposed reference to it in 1972.
The referendum is destined to have a lasting impact not merely because of the Brexit process that it set in place but because it produced a very different and new set of political fault-lines. These are still in the early stages of influencing future electoral alignments, not merely on our relationship with the EU or how we might view the United Kingdom’s role in the wider world, but raw domestic politics. As will be set out here, it is already possible to discern change that it has caused and the effect this has.
The best research available on the outcome reveals the distinctive divisions that occurred within the British electorate on 23 June. These revolve around age, income, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, and party alignment. There is also, although it is more challenging to measure, the effect of personal location with those who live or work in major metropolitan centres being far more likely to favour staying in the EU when compared with those wholly based in suburbs, small towns or villages.
So who are the two separate electorates who made up Remain (48%) and Leave (52%)? There is a clear and consistent division on age. Some 73% of those aged 18-24 backed Remain along with 62% of those aged 25-34. A majority of the electorate over 45, by contrast, backed Leave rising to 60% of those aged 65 or over, whose participation rate in the referendum was particularly high. Social classes AB chose Remain with 57% but all other income categories backed Leave, marginally in the case of the C1 segment (51%), and decisively for C2 and DE voters (both at 64% for Leave).
This was reinforced by educational attainment. Of those with a degree 57% preferred Remain. If one held a second degree then the figure rose to 64%. Those in full-time education on referendum day itself plumped for Remain with 81% of them in favour. There was a racial and ethnic element as well with those describing themselves as White aligning with Leave on a 54%-46% split while those who called themselves Asian were 67% for Remain and those who deemed themselves Black went 73% Remain.
The final aspect is party affiliation. In terms of their ballot cast at the May 2015 General Election, the Conservatives went 58%-42% for Leave, Labour opted 63%-37% for Remain, UKIP supporters chose Leave by 96%-4% (who on Earth were those 4%?), Liberal Democrats embraced Remain by a 70%-30% margin, adherents of the SNP preferred Remain 64%-36% and Greens the same by 75%-25%.
The net effect of all this is to leave behind two political camps which would appear to lack internal consistency by conventional political standards. The Remain constituency includes large numbers of affluent, metropolitan Conservatives, young people in general and students especially, the left wing public sector middle classes and poorer ethnic minorities. For highly diverse reasons these might be described as an internationalist alliance of people basically at ease with the modern UK and world.
The Leave team involves middle income Conservatives with little connection to cities, the retired, parts of the public sector working classes and the poorest sections of the white electorate. It is basically a nationalist-inclined group of people with either social/cultural or economic unease. To a limited extent (but not as an absolute match) there is thus a legitimate comparison with the Clinton and Trump voters in the US except that referendums are determined solely by the popular vote.
Has public opinion shifted since the referendum?
Not much, if at all. On every metric those who voted for Remain think that they were right to do so and that Brexit will prove to be a complicated and challenging exercise. It is equally true that those who backed Leave are as certain of their position now as in June and think fears about Brexit will either prove exaggerated or are a price worth paying in order to restore lost national sovereignty.
If there has been any short-term movement at all, it has probably been in the Leave direction as the performance of the economy over the past six months has eased concerns about the economic risks associated with leaving the EU which was the largest single reason why those who came down for Remain made that choice (less than one in ten Remain voters indicated that liking the EU was the main cause of their decision).
There has also plainly been a decline in morale for the Remain camp and increasing resignation to the outcome. When one pollster recently asked whether there should be a second referendum, either because the exact terms of withdrawal were not currently known or in the event of a serious economic slowdown, in each case the public rejected the idea by a 52% to 33% margin with 15% undecided, the critical factor being that 27% of those who backed Remain are unwilling (at this stage anyway) to assert that a second referendum on the issue would be desirable.
Who are Remain and Leave electors indicating that they would vote for now?
The two constituencies have responded to events since June very differently. The last YouGov poll published earlier this month had a wide overall Conservative lead with that party at 42%, Labour at 25%, UKIP on 12%, the Liberal Democrats at 11%, the SNP around 6% and the Green Party on 4%.
Yet when the figures are dissected accounting to whether the person voted Remain or Leave, two completely distinct outcomes emerge. The Remain electorate puts Labour ahead on 35% then the Conservatives on 31%, the Liberal Democrats at 19%, the SNP on 9%, the Greens 6% and UKIP nil. The Leave component, on the other hand, offers the Conservatives a massive 53%, UKIP 24%, Labour a feeble 14%, the Liberal Democrats a humble 4%, the SNP a mere 3% and the Greens just 2%. Even allowing for the mixed bag that are the two segments this is an astonishing set of party numbers.
What movement has there been since June and is it politically consequential?
There have been two shifts in public opinion of statistical significance since the referendum and the replacement of David Cameron by Theresa May. The first has been some movement towards the Conservatives by those who voted UKIP in 2015, presumably out of a sense that Brexit means there is little point to UKIP any longer and they find Mrs May more appealing than her predecessor. This is backed up by a very slight swing of working class anti-EU and anti-Corbyn 2015 Labour voters in her direction as well. On the other side, there is evidence of some repositioning by strongly pro-EU 2015 Labour voters to the Liberal Democrats who are trying to brand themselves as the anti-Brexit party.
This has had two important effects. The first is that the Conservative vote now consists more solidly of individuals that voted to Leave in June (about 66% of the total) than it did on 23 June when a lower tally of 58% of 2015 Conservative electors wanted to be shot of EU membership. With UKIP perhaps set for continued decline, the Tories are increasingly becoming the Brexit party and that will not be lost on the Prime Minister. The second is that any movement away from Labour towards the Liberal Democrats (even if small) has the effect of dividing an already split anti-Tory vote yet further.