Splitting the Difference? The circumstances that might see Labour divide

Although the amount of hard data is limited, the working assumption is that Jeremy Corbyn is the clear favourite to be re-elected Leader of the Labour Party. It is also widely expected that the stark divide between himself and a small band of supporters and the vast bulk of Labour MPs will be very difficult if not impossible to resolve. That has led to speculation acknowledged by very senior figures in the party that a Corbyn victory could trigger a formal split within the Labour Party, if not straight away than at some point in the course of this Parliament. Such a development would have a seismic impact on British politics. How likely is it to happen and under what conditions may it actually occur?
Splits of this scale are a rarity in UK politics and catastrophic when they are witnessed. The decline of the old Liberal Party started with the defection of the Liberal Unionists at the end of the 19th century over the issue of Irish Home Rule, and when that was finally overcome it was revisited when the party split again between those loyal to Asquith or to Lloyd George over the conduct of the First World War. The death of the former led to a temporary period of re-unification until the Liberals managed to split three ways in the 1930s between those who entered the National Government in 1931 and stuck with that administration, another faction which initially went in to office then but withdrew when that coalition abandoned free trade for protectionism, and a further set (including Lloyd George) which never took part in the National Government at all. The party was so damaged by all this splitting that after 1945 it had been reduced to a rump of six MPs (briefly five in the 1950s) and it did not recover to be a political entity of any significance until more than 50 years later.
Fratricide has been almost as traumatic for Labour. In 1931 it split between its leader and 14 other MPs (including the Chancellor) who were willing to serve in and provide nominal leadership for a National Government dominated by the Conservative Party, and the rest of the Labour movement. This led to devastating defeats in the 1931 and 1935 elections. It flirted with a split again in the late 1950s and early 1960s when the leader and most MPs found themselves at odds with much of the broader party over whether or not the UK should have nuclear weapons. A switch inside the trade unions in favour of the leadership ultimately resolved that question. In 1981, part of the moderate wing of the parliamentary party bolted in protest at the leftist shift in policy (with nuclear weapons again serving as a key catalyst) prompting the creation of the SDP. This resulted in heavy Labour defeats in 1983 and 1987 but also destroyed the SDP itself, most of which agreed to be absorbed into the Liberals in 1988 with the continuing SDP lasting for two more years before being wound up.
The lessons of the SDP would have enormous influence over any decision to split
The failure of the SDP suggests the minimum circumstances in which any split in this Parliament might be seen as having any chance of success, and thus be worth active and serious contemplation. The SDP suffered from five arguably interconnected difficulties, some of which were of its choosing.
First, it did not compete for the Labour ‘brand’ but sought to challenge it through an alliance with the Liberal Party. Second, it attracted just 28 sitting Labour MPs (plus one Conservative MP) when it launched in 1981, which was a little more than a tenth of the PLP at the time. Third, it never acquired and hardly sought to obtain any endorsement from within the trade unions. Fourth, it did not have much of an infrastructure or an organisation at the constituency level. Finally, it was short of money.
For a split this time to work, therefore, those willing to lead one would need to operate differently. They would need to present themselves as ‘Real Labour’ or ‘True Labour’ and assert that it was the Corbynites who were the outsiders, the ‘entryists’ who had exploited weak barriers to entry in order to take over what was not rightly ‘their’ political party. A split would have to involve a very significant number of MPs, ideally a majority of the parliamentary Labour Party, so that whoever become head of this Real Labour/True Labour force became the Leader of the Opposition and hence the principal challenger to be Prime Minister as well. Some trade union support would be of value (even in an era where the unionised proportion of those employed is still falling). They would want to be in a position to inherit much of the existing Labour Party organisation and structure, in part to enhance their electoral prospects but also to reinforce that legitimacy claim to being the real Labour Party that had been obliged to reconstitute itself. They would also want to be sure of a funding base.
These are demanding conditions but the Corbyn camp could bring them in to being
The above set of conditions for a successful split or counter-coup are rather tough ones. On the face of it, most anti-Corbyn MPs might conclude that they would be better off allowing the current leader to take Labour in to a 2020 election, await the probable humiliating outcome and then reclaim their party afterwards on a ‘we told you so’ message. However, waiting that long might not be practical.
The Corbyn camp could create the conditions in which a split was triggered. This would come about through at least two and probably all three of the following initiatives. First, by the policy agenda that a re-elected Mr Corbyn claimed a mandate for and which his backers insisted on adopting. The totemic matter would be, once again, nuclear weapons (with attitudes towards Europe and finding any possibility of reversing the referendum result lurking in there too).
The second would be if the Corbyn contingent use his re-election, and their probably enhanced block on the Labour National Executive Committee, to change the rules for future Labour leadership elections to reduce the total of Labour MPs required to nominate candidates for Leader and Deputy Leader to a token number. This would flag the risk of permanent hard left victories in Labour internal elections with little care for the wider consequences.
Finally, whether in a co-ordinated or more informal form, there was evidence that Labour MPs would be de-selected in the second half of this Parliament. Such a threat would mean that simply sitting still and expecting a heavy defeat in 2020 was not a viable option personally for incumbent MPs and they would be no worse off taking all the risks that a split entails.
The role of the trade unions will probably be decisive
If a split were to take place it would be more likely to happen in 2017 or 2018 than 2016. The trade unions remain a potent enough force inside the Labour Party to be pivotal players. Mr Corbyn has survived the departure of virtually his entire previous Shadow Cabinet and a crushing defeat in a vote of no confidence, yet is on the ballot paper for re-election without needing to be nominated because the high commands of the trade unions would not participate in any effort to force his resignation that did not have the blessing of the wider membership.
The first signs of division in the top tier of the unions have, though, now been witnessed with the GMB endorsing Owen Smith in this election. The unions are also mostly supporters of renewing Trident (largely because they have members in the workforce concerned). They are also a big enough section on the NEC that were they to align as one against Mr Corbyn and his Momentum allies to preserve the status quo on the leadership rules and avoid de-selections then either an effective challenge to Mr Corbyn in 2017 could be mounted or he could remain in office but sufficiently neutered in terms of policy and control that Labour could endure the pain of defeat in 2020 and then return to something close to normal service. If either the unions are themselves too divided to shore up the Labour Party, or some of them also conclude that it is only through a split that their authority more broadly can be retained, then a split could happen.