UK and EU limber up for Brexit talks

After the colourful manner of the Prime Minister’s Brexit positioning last week, and the slightly more monochrome response by the EU’s chief negotiator, there has been some role reversal in the past few days.
It was a more animated Michel Barnier who gave a speech this week on the back of the EU’s publication of its negotiating position, in contrast to the limited fanfare accompanying the UK’s equivalent publication a couple of days later. Perhaps the Michelangelo references in Mr Johnson’s recent Greenwich speech have provided enough rhetorical firepower to sustain the UK position until the sides meet formally for the first time in the next week. Whatever the case, the hard yards start here.
Put aside the style issues and we have two starkly different starting points. The EU is highly focused on the scale of its economic relationship with the UK, the proximity of this significant competitor and the need to be in the regulatory driving seat going forward. Its ‘offer’, contained in the negotiating guidelines approved by the EU-27 member states, is framed by the concept of the ‘level playing field’, referenced more than a dozen times in the document. The aim is to keep the UK on the same playing field and, by and large, play by rules agreed (set?) by the EU and then adjudicated by its institutions.
It is not exactly news that the UK government rejects this approach, newly confirmed in the White Paper setting out its formal position. Pointedly, perhaps, the phrase ‘level playing field’ does not even appear once in Britain’s core policy statement. By contrast, the UK’s opening salvo references ‘Canada’ or ‘CETA’ (the ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement’ with Canada) over 20 times, often with the word ‘precedent’ loitering nearby.
The ducking of the ‘level playing field’ concept (shorthand for ongoing alignment on competition, state aid, environmental, labour, tax and other matters), and the repetitive Canadian analogue, combined to fire up Mr Barnier. The EU is increasingly wary of what it thinks looks like a British retreat from the (non-binding) Political Declaration agreed alongside the Withdrawal Treaty (which now has the force of international law). Since this contains the principles on which the ‘future partnership’ is supposed to be based, including the ‘level playing field’ and the UK-EU arrangements for trade with the island of Ireland, it is not seen to be a good start to the serious negotiations.
If this first issue is causing angst, it has to be said that some European diplomats are beyond irritated by the comparison with Canada, whose trade with the EU is about 10% of the UK’s. For the UK this not-too-subtle approach is not designed to be contrary – the differences in the situations are well understood in Britain.
But there is an important point for the government to make: the UK is opting out of privileged access to the EU’s markets as the price of achieving regulatory sovereignty; in doing so it does not expect to endure any less favourable arrangements than the EU has accepted for other developed economies such as Canada, Japan and Korea. And while the EU publicly acknowledges this choice, to some its proposals suggest a ’heads I win, tails you lose’ approach where the UK chooses to lose its market benefits, but cannot escape the regulatory obligations.
How quickly will talks move beyond this skirmishing? How soon will the sides establish if they have two utterly incompatible visions for the future relationship or simply a clash of styles? We have to hope that it will be very quickly – not only is there a very short 10 month timescale until any agreement comes into force, but the UK has also now declared that in June it will assess the negotiations with a view to ending talks if substantial progress has not been made.
This is being interpreted by some as learning from Mrs May’s mistakes (the EU did not ever really believe she would countenance ‘no-deal’) and Mr Johnson’s success (he threatened to walk away and secured a deal – ignore the fact that it was largely the original EU offer which Mrs May rejected).
So, negotiating bluff or strategic determination? That we even pose the question suggests that Mr Johnson has secured a positioning success and ensured he will be listened to on the Continent as well as at home. If only the stakes were not quite so high.